Separation of powers is a political doctrine originating in the writings of Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws, in which he argued for a constitutional government with three separate branches, each of which would have defined authority to check the powers of the others. This philosophy heavily influenced the United States Constitution, according to which the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of the United States government are kept distinct in order to prevent abuse of power. The American form of separation of powers is associated with a system of checks and balances.
During the Age of Enlightenment, philosophers such as Montesquieu advocated the principle in their writings, whereas others, such as Thomas Hobbes, strongly opposed it. Montesquieu was one of the foremost supporters of separating the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. His writings considerably influenced the Founding Fathers of the United States, such as Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, who participated in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 which drafted the Constitution.
Some U.S. states did not observe a strict separation of powers in the 18th century. In New Jersey, the governor also functioned as a member of the state's highest court and as the presiding officer of one house of the New Jersey Legislature. The president of Delaware was a member of the Court of Appeals; the presiding officers of the two houses of the state legislature also served in the executive department as vice presidents. In both Delaware and Pennsylvania, members of the executive council served at the same time as judges. On the other hand, many southern states explicitly required separation of powers. Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia all kept the branches of government "separate and distinct."
Congress has the sole power to legislate for the United States. Under the nondelegation doctrine, Congress may not delegate its lawmaking responsibilities to any other agency. In this vein, the Supreme Court held in the 1998 case Clinton v. City of New York that Congress could not delegate a "line-item veto" to the President, by powers vested in the government by the Constitution.
Where Congress does not make great and sweeping delegations of its authority, the Supreme Court has been less stringent. One of the earliest cases involving the exact limits of non-delegation was Wayman v. Southard 23 U.S. (10 Wet.) 1, 42 (1825). Congress had delegated to the courts the power to prescribe judicial procedure; it was contended that Congress had thereby unconstitutionally clothed the judiciary with legislative powers. While Chief Justice John Marshall conceded that the determination of rules of procedure was a legislative function, he distinguished between "important" subjects and mere details. Marshall wrote that "a general provision may be made, and power is given to those who are to act under such general provisions, to fill up the details."
Marshall's words and future court decisions gave Congress much latitude in delegating powers. It was not until the 1930s that the Supreme Court held a delegation of authority unconstitutional. In a case involving the creation of the National Recovery Administration called A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), Congress could not authorize the president to formulate codes of "fair competition." It was held that Congress must set some standards governing the actions of executive officers. The Court, however, has deemed that phrases such as "just and reasonable," "public interest" and "public convenience" suffice.
Executive power is vested, with exceptions and qualifications,[1] in the President. By law (Section 2.) the president becomes the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, Militia of several states when called into service, has power to make treaties and appointments to office "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate," receive Ambassadors and Public Ministers, and "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" (Section 3.) By using these words, the Constitution does not require the president to personally enforce the law; rather, officers subordinate to the president may perform such duties. The Constitution empowers the president to ensure the faithful execution of the laws made by Congress and approved by the President. Congress may itself terminate such appointments, by impeachment, and restrict the president. Bodies such as the War Claims Commission (created by the War Claims Act of 1948), the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission—all quasi-judicial—often have direct Congressional oversight.
Congress often writes legislation to restrain executive officials to the performance of their duties, as laid out by the laws Congress passes. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983), the Supreme Court decided (a) The prescription for legislative action in Art. I, § 1—requiring all legislative powers to be vested in a Congress consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives—and § 7—requiring every bill passed by the House and Senate, before becoming law, to be presented to the president, and, if he disapproves, to be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House—represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure. This procedure is an integral part of the constitutional design for the separation of powers. Further rulings clarified the case; even both Houses acting together cannot override Executive vetoes without a 2⁄3 majority. Legislation may always prescribe regulations governing executive officers.
Judicial power—the power to decide cases and controversies—is vested in the Supreme Court and inferior courts established by Congress. The judges must be appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, hold office during good behavior and receive compensations that may not be diminished during their continuance in office. If a court's judges do not have such attributes, the court may not exercise the judicial power of the United States. Courts exercising the judicial power are called "constitutional courts."
However, because Congress controls the budget, jurisdiction, and structure of the federal courts, the judiciary as a branch is better described as largely dependent on Congress rather than independent of it. Although the Constitution, not Congress, creates the Supreme Court, it is Congress that decides whether to create lower federal courts, how to arrange them, how many judges will be appointed to them, and whether to abolish them. Congress also has the power to grant jurisdiction to and withdraw jurisdiction from, lower federal courts. Moreover, although judges have the power to issue final judgments, they must rely on the executive for enforcement.[2]
Congress may also establish "legislative courts," which do not take the form of judicial agencies or commissions, whose members do not have the same security of tenure or compensation as the constitutional court judges. Legislative courts may not exercise the judicial power of the United States. In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. (1856), the Supreme Court held that a legislative court may not decide "a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty," as such a suit is inherently judicial. Legislative courts may only adjudicate "public rights" questions (cases between the government and an individual and political determinations).
The president exercises a check over Congress through their power to veto bills, but Congress may override any veto (excluding the so-called "pocket veto") by a two-thirds majority in each house. When the two houses of Congress cannot agree on a date for adjournment, the president may settle the dispute. Either house or both houses may be called into emergency session by the president. The Vice President serves as president of the Senate, but they may only vote to break a tie.
The president, as noted above, appoints judges with the Senate's advice and consent. They also have the power to issue pardons and reprieves. Such pardons are not subject to confirmation by either the House of Representatives or the Senate, or even to acceptance by the recipient. The President is not mandated to carry out the orders of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court does not have any enforcement power; the enforcement power lies solely with the executive branch. Thus, the executive branch can place a check on the Supreme Court through refusal to execute the orders of the court. However the prestige of the Court makes that difficult to do.[3]
The president is the civilian Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. They have the authority to command them to take appropriate military action in the event of a sudden crisis.[4] However, only the Congress is explicitly granted the power to declare war per se, as well as to raise, fund and maintain the armed forces. Congress also has the duty and authority to prescribe the laws and regulations under which the armed forces operate, such as the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and requires that all Generals and Admirals appointed by the president be confirmed by a majority vote of the Senate before they can assume their office.