Пассажиры были уведомлены перед отплытием из Нью-Йорка об общей опасности плавания в этом районе на британском судне, но само нападение произошло без предупреждения. Из подводного положения в 700 м по правому борту U-20 под командованием капитан-лейтенанта Вальтера Швигера выпустила одну торпеду по лайнеру Cunard . После попадания торпеды внутри судна произошел второй взрыв, которое затем затонуло всего через 18 минут. [2] [3] : 429 Задачей U-20 было торпедирование военных кораблей и лайнеров в районе Лузитании . В конце концов, из 1960 пассажиров, членов экипажа и безбилетных пассажиров на борту выжило только 763 человека ( 39%), [1] и около 128 погибших были американскими гражданами. [4] Затопление настроило общественное мнение во многих странах против Германии . Это также способствовало вступлению Америки в войну два года спустя; Изображения пострадавшего лайнера активно использовались в пропаганде и кампаниях по вербовке в армию США. [3] : 497–503
Современные расследования как в Соединенном Королевстве, так и в Соединенных Штатах точных причин гибели судна были затруднены необходимостью секретности военного времени и пропагандистской кампанией, призванной гарантировать, что вся вина ляжет на Германию. [2] На момент затопления в трюме судна, в первую очередь пассажирского, находилось около 173 тонн военных припасов, включая 4,2 миллиона винтовочных патронов, почти 5000 артиллерийских снарядов, наполненных шрапнелью, и 3240 латунных взрывателей ударного действия. [5] [6] Дебаты о законности способа, которым оно было потоплено, бушевали на протяжении всей войны и после нее. [7]
Фон
Когда Лузитания была построена, ее строительные и эксплуатационные расходы субсидировались британским правительством, с условием, что она может быть преобразована в вооруженный торговый крейсер, если это необходимо. С началом Первой мировой войны Британское Адмиралтейство рассматривало ее для реквизиции в качестве вооруженного торгового крейсера, и она была включена в официальный список AMC. [8]
Адмиралтейство затем отменило свое предыдущее решение и решило вообще не использовать его в качестве AMC; большие лайнеры, такие как Lusitania, потребляли огромное количество угля (910 тонн в день или 37,6 тонн в час) и стали серьезной утечкой топлива из запасов Адмиралтейства, поэтому экспресс-лайнеры были признаны неподходящими для этой роли, когда подходили более мелкие крейсеры. Они также были очень отличительными; поэтому вместо них в качестве транспортов использовались более мелкие лайнеры. Lusitania осталась в официальном списке AMC и была указана как вспомогательный крейсер в издании Jane's All the World's Fighting Ships 1914 года вместе с Mauretania . [9]
С началом военных действий опасения за безопасность «Лузитании» и других крупных лайнеров возросли. Во время первого перехода судна на восток после начала войны его покрасили в унылый серый цвет в попытке скрыть его идентичность и сделать его более труднообнаружимым визуально. Когда выяснилось, что немецкий флот контролируется Королевским флотом , и его коммерческая угроза почти полностью исчезла, очень скоро стало казаться, что Атлантика безопасна для таких кораблей, как «Лузитания» , если бронирование оправдывает расходы на их содержание в эксплуатации.
Многие из крупных лайнеров были поставлены на прикол осенью и зимой 1914–1915 годов, отчасти из-за падения спроса на пассажирские перевозки через Атлантику, а отчасти для защиты от повреждений из-за мин или других опасностей. Среди наиболее узнаваемых из этих лайнеров некоторые в конечном итоге использовались в качестве войсковых транспортов, в то время как другие стали госпитальными судами . Лузитания оставалась в коммерческой эксплуатации; хотя бронирование на ее борту было отнюдь не высоким в течение той осени и зимы, спрос был достаточно сильным, чтобы оставить ее в гражданской эксплуатации. Однако были приняты меры экономии. Одной из них было закрытие ее котельной № 4 для экономии угля и расходов на команду; это снизило ее максимальную скорость с более чем 25 до 21 узла (с 46 до 39 км/ч). Тем не менее, она была самым быстрым пассажирским лайнером первого класса, оставшимся в коммерческой эксплуатации. [10]
С исчезновением очевидных опасностей замаскированная схема окраски судна также была отменена, и судно вернули к гражданским цветам. Его имя было выделено позолотой, его трубы были перекрашены в их обычную ливрею Cunard, а его надстройка снова была выкрашена в белый цвет. Одним из изменений было добавление полосы бронзового/золотого цвета вокруг основания надстройки прямо над черной краской. [11]
1915
Британия установила морскую блокаду Германии в начале войны в августе 1914 года, опубликовав полный список контрабанды , в который вошли даже продукты питания, а в начале ноября 1914 года Британия объявила Северное море «военной зоной», и любые корабли, заходящие в Северное море, делали это на свой страх и риск. [12] [13]
Немецкий довоенный подводный флот в порту Киля . U-20 вторая слева.
К началу 1915 года начала материализоваться новая угроза британскому судоходству: подводные лодки (U-boats ). Сначала немцы использовали их только для атак на военные суда, и они добивались лишь случайных, но иногда впечатляющих успехов. Затем подводные лодки начали время от времени атаковать торговые суда, хотя почти всегда в соответствии со старыми правилами для крейсеров . Отчаянно желая получить преимущество в Атлантике и определить роль для флота, и сильно переоценивая эффективность нового оружия, Адмиралтейство под руководством Гуго фон Поля решило усилить свою подводную кампанию. 4 февраля 1915 года он объявил моря вокруг Британских островов зоной военных действий: с 18 февраля корабли союзников в этом районе могли быть потоплены без предупреждения. Это была не совсем неограниченная подводная война , поскольку будут предприняты усилия, чтобы избежать потопления нейтральных судов. [14] Однако штаб Германского имперского адмиралтейства тайно приказал капитанам нацеливаться на пассажирские суда, поскольку считалось, что это отпугнет другие суда. [15] Поскольку Германия начала кампанию всего с 21 подводной лодкой, многие из которых не были в рабочем состоянии, многие не восприняли угрозу всерьез. Правительство США предупредило немцев, что они будут нести «строгую ответственность» за любые смерти американцев в результате кампании. [16]
Реакция на заявление Лузитании характеризовалась замешательством. В море по пути в Ливерпуль во время объявления капитан Дэниел Доу вывесил флаг США, чтобы отговорить от атаки, по настоянию своих американских пассажиров. Это вызвало бурю споров со стороны американских властей и Германии. [17]
В следующем рейсе Lusitania должна была прибыть в Ливерпуль 6 марта 1915 года. Адмиралтейство выпустило для нее особые инструкции о том, как избегать подводных лодок. Несмотря на острую нехватку эсминцев , адмирал Генри Оливер приказал HMS Louis и Laverock сопровождать Lusitania и принял дополнительные меры предосторожности, отправив корабль Q Lyons патрулировать Ливерпульский залив. [18] Один из командиров эсминцев попытался выяснить местонахождение Lusitania , позвонив по телефону Cunard, который отказался выдавать какую-либо информацию и направил его в Адмиралтейство. В море корабли связались с Lusitania по радио, но у них не было кодов, используемых для связи с торговыми судами, и поэтому общались открытым текстом. Поскольку это подвергло бы его корабль существенному риску, капитан Доу отказался сообщать свое местоположение, кроме как кодом. Он указал свое местоположение значительно дальше от своего фактического местоположения и, оставив военные корабли неспособными его обнаружить, продолжил путь в Ливерпуль без сопровождения. [3] : 91–2 [19] [20] : 76–7 [17]
В связи с угрозой были внесены некоторые изменения в Lusitania и ее операции. Ей было приказано не вывешивать никаких флагов в зоне боевых действий; командиру корабля было отправлено несколько предупреждений и советов, чтобы помочь ему решить, как лучше всего защитить свой корабль от новой угрозы, и также кажется, что ее трубы, скорее всего, были окрашены в темно-серый цвет, чтобы сделать ее менее заметной для вражеских подводных лодок. Не было никакой надежды скрыть ее настоящую личность, поскольку ее профиль был настолько хорошо известен, и не было предпринято никаких попыток закрасить название корабля на носу. [21] [22]
Неизвестно всем, что подводная война собиралась стать более опасной. 28 марта, во время так называемого инцидента с Thrasher , немецкая подводная лодка остановила британское пассажирское судно Falaba на поверхности. Очевидцы сообщили, что подводная лодка дала судну всего около 10 минут на эвакуацию, прежде чем торпедировать судно, что привело к первой американской гибели в войне. 1 апреля адмирал Густав Бахманн , глава немецкого Адмиралтейства, направил кайзеру меморандум. В нем подробно описывалось удручающе малое количество потопленных до сих пор кораблей, и Бахманн утверждал, что это показывает, что подводная война может быть действительно эффективной только в том случае, если подводные лодки будут полностью неограниченны и, таким образом, смогут атаковать без определения идентичности и национальной принадлежности судов. При поддержке Тирпица кайзер 2 апреля разослал секретные инструкции, чтобы воспрепятствовать распространенной тактике всплытия для атаки судов и подчеркнуть опасность этого. Это создало то, что историк Артур Линк называет «оперативной сумеречной зоной», в которой было бы легче совершать ошибки. Не было никаких улучшений в количестве кораблей, потопленных в соответствии с этой инструкцией, но 6 из 17 судов, потопленных в апреле, были нейтральными. Немцы убедили себя, что американцы беззубы. «Политика американского правительства доминирует над одной мыслью — не ввязываться ни в какие осложнения. «Мы хотим держаться подальше от всего» — это единственное правило». [23] В конце апреля/начале мая немцы совершили нападения на два дополнительных американских судна, Cushing и Gulflight , первое (29 апреля) — воздушная атака, которая не привела к человеческим жертвам, а второе (1 мая) — атака подводной лодки на танкер, в результате которой погибли три человека. Президент Вильсон не дал официального ответа ни на один из этих инцидентов, пока события не настигли его. [24]
Капитан Доу, очевидно, страдавший от стресса из-за управления своим судном в зоне боевых действий, покинул судно; позже «Кунард» объяснил, что он «устал и действительно болен». [25] Его заменил новый командир, капитан Уильям Томас Тернер , который командовал «Лузитанией» , «Мавританией» и «Аквитанией» в годы до войны. [26] 17 апреля 1915 года «Лузитания» покинула Ливерпуль в свой 201-й трансатлантический рейс и прибыла в Нью-Йорк 24 апреля.
Официальное предупреждение Имперского посольства Германии относительно поездок в Великобританию, опубликованное 30 апреля
В середине апреля немецкий посол Иоганн Генрих фон Бернсторф , который давно беспокоился о законности февральской подводной кампании и считал, что американцы недооценивают опасность, проконсультировался с группой представителей других немецких административных ведомств и решил выпустить общее предупреждение американской прессе. [27] Это уведомление должно было появиться в 50 американских газетах, в том числе в Нью-Йорке: [28]
Примечание ! Путешественникам, намеревающимся отправиться в Атлантическое путешествие, напоминаем, что между Германией и ее союзниками и Великобританией и ее союзниками существует состояние войны; что зона войны включает воды, прилегающие к Британским островам; что в соответствии с официальным уведомлением, данным Имперским правительством Германии, суда, плавающие под флагом Великобритании или любого из ее союзников, подлежат уничтожению в этих водах и что путешественники, плавающие в зоне военных действий на судах Великобритании или ее союзников, делают это на свой страх и риск. Имперское посольство Германии
Вашингтон, округ Колумбия, 22 апреля 1915 г.
Предполагалось, что уведомление появится в субботу 24 апреля, 1 мая и 8 мая, но из-за технических проблем оно появилось только 30 апреля, за день до отплытия «Лузитании» , появляясь в некоторых случаях рядом с рекламой обратного рейса. Сопоставление было совпадением, [27] [29] но предупреждение вызвало некоторое волнение в прессе, раздражение американского правительства и беспокойство пассажиров и экипажа судна. [30]
Последнее путешествие
Отправление
Запись отплытия «Лузитании » из Нью-Йорка в ее последнее плавание
В то время как многие британские пассажирские суда были призваны на службу для военных нужд, «Лузитания» оставалась на своем обычном маршруте между Ливерпулем и Нью-Йорком. Капитан Тернер, известный как «Боулер Билл» за свой любимый прибрежный головной убор, пытался успокоить пассажиров, объяснив, что скорость корабля делает его безопасным от атак подводной лодки. [31] Даже на своей пониженной скорости корабль намного превышал скорость подводной лодки (16 узлов на поверхности, 9 узлов под водой), что требовало от корабля пройти очень близко к ожидающей его подводной лодке, чтобы быть атакованным.
Лузитания покидает Нью-Йорк 1 мая. Последняя известная фотография перед затоплением.
Отправление из Нью-Йорка в обратный рейс в Ливерпуль состоялось в полдень 1 мая, с опозданием на два часа из-за пересадки в последнюю минуту сорока одного пассажира и экипажа с недавно реквизированного судна Cameronia . [3] : 132–133 Вскоре после отправления на борту были обнаружены трое мужчин, говорящих по-немецки, которые прятались в кладовой стюарда. Детектив-инспектор Уильям Пирпойнт из полиции Ливерпуля, путешествовавший под видом пассажира первого класса, допросил их, прежде чем запереть в камерах для дальнейшего допроса, когда судно достигло Ливерпуля. [3] : 156, 445–446 Также среди экипажа был англичанин Нил Лич, который до войны работал учителем в Германии. Лич был интернирован, но позже освобожден Германией. Немецкое посольство в Вашингтоне было уведомлено о прибытии Лича в Америку, где он встретился с известными немецкими агентами. Лич и три немецких безбилетника утонули вместе с судном. Их нашли с фотооборудованием, и, вероятно, им было поручено шпионить за судном. Скорее всего, Пирпойнт, который выжил после затопления, [32] уже был проинформирован о Личе. [3] : 131–132, 445
Таким образом, когда « Лузитания» отошла от пирса 54 , на ее борту находилось 1960 человек. Помимо экипажа из 693 человек и трех безбилетных пассажиров, на борту находилось 1264 пассажира, в основном граждане Великобритании, а также большое количество канадцев и 159 американцев. 124 пассажира были детьми. Ее каюты первого класса, за которые ее хорошо ценили на рейсах по Северной Атлантике, были забронированы чуть более чем на половину вместимости — 290 человек. Второй класс был сильно перебронирован — 601 пассажир, что намного превышало максимальную вместимость в 460 человек. В то время как большое количество маленьких детей и младенцев помогло сократить тесноту в ограниченном количестве двух- и четырехместных кают, ситуация была исправлена, когда некоторым пассажирам второго класса разрешили занять пустые каюты первого класса. В третьем классе ситуация считалась нормой для восточного перехода, и только 370 путешествовали в каютах, рассчитанных на 1186 человек. [33] [1]
Подводная активность
Вальтер Швигер, командир U-20
Пока лайнер пересекал океан, Британское Адмиралтейство отслеживало перемещения U-20 , которой командовал капитан-лейтенант Вальтер Швигер , с помощью радиоперехватов и радиопеленгации . Подводная лодка вышла из Боркума 30 апреля, направляясь на северо-запад через Северное море . 2 мая она достигла Питерхеда и проследовала вокруг севера Шотландии и Ирландии, а затем вдоль западного и южного побережья Ирландии, чтобы войти в Ирландское море с юга. Хотя отправление подлодки, пункт назначения и ожидаемое время прибытия были известны в Комнате 40 в Адмиралтействе, деятельность отдела декодирования считалась настолько секретной, что она была неизвестна даже обычному разведывательному отделу, который отслеживал вражеские корабли, или торговому отделу, ответственному за предупреждение торговых судов. Только самые высокие офицеры в Адмиралтействе видели информацию и передавали предупреждения только тогда, когда считали это необходимым. [34]
27 марта Room 40 перехватил сообщение, которое ясно продемонстрировало, что немцы взломали код, используемый для передачи сообщений британским торговым судам. Крейсеры, защищающие торговые суда, были предупреждены не использовать код для указания направления судоходству, поскольку он мог так же легко привлечь вражеские подводные лодки, как и увести корабли от них. Однако Queenstown (теперь Cobh ) не получил этого предупреждения и продолжал давать указания в скомпрометированном коде, который не менялся до тех пор, пока не затонула Lusitania . В это время Королевский флот был в значительной степени вовлечен в операции, предшествовавшие высадке в Галлиполи , и разведывательный отдел проводил программу дезинформации, чтобы убедить Германию ожидать нападения на ее северное побережье. В рамках этого с 19 апреля было остановлено обычное движение через Ла-Манш в Нидерланды, и просочились ложные сообщения о передвижениях войсковых кораблей из портов на западном и южном побережьях Великобритании. Это привело к требованию со стороны немецкой армии о наступательных действиях против ожидаемых перемещений войск и, как следствие, к всплеску активности немецких подводных лодок на западном побережье Великобритании. Флот был предупрежден об ожидании дополнительных подводных лодок, но это предупреждение не было передано тем частям флота, которые имели дело с торговыми судами. Возвращение линкора Orion из HMNB Devonport в Шотландию было отложено до 4 мая, и ему было приказано оставаться в 100 морских милях (190 км) от побережья Ирландии. [35]
5 мая U-20 остановила торговую шхуну Earl of Lathom у мыса Олд-Хед-оф-Кинсейл , проверила ее документы, затем приказала экипажу покинуть судно, прежде чем потопить шхуну орудийным огнем. 6 мая U-20 выпустила торпеду по Cayo Romano , британскому пароходу с Кубы под нейтральным флагом у мыса Фастнет , едва не пролетев несколько футов. [36] В 22:30 5 мая Королевский флот разослал всем кораблям незакодированное предупреждение — «Подводные лодки активны у южного побережья Ирландии», — а в полночь к обычным ночным предупреждениям было добавлено: «Подводная лодка у мыса Фастнет». [37] 6 мая U-20 потопила 6000-тонный пароход Candidate . Затем она не смогла выстрелить в 16000-тонный лайнер SS Arabic (1902) , потому что, хотя она и держала прямой курс, лайнер был слишком быстр, но затем потопила еще одно 6000-тонное британское грузовое судно без флага, Centurion , все в районе легкого судна Coningbeg , примерно в 70 милях к востоку от возможной атаки. Согласно архивам Room 40, затопление Centurion в начале дня 6-го числа было последним сообщенным местоположением субмарины до атаки на Lusitania . [38]
Конкретное упоминание о подводной лодке было исключено из полуночной передачи 6–7 мая, поскольку новости о новых затоплениях еще не достигли флота в Квинстауне, и было правильно предположено, что в Фастнете больше нет подводной лодки. [39] Утром 6 мая Лузитания все еще находилась в 750 морских милях (1390 км) к западу от южной Ирландии. Однако капитан Тернер получил два предупреждающих сообщения тем вечером. Одно в 7:52 вечера повторяло информацию о том, что подводные лодки активны у южного побережья Ирландии (по ошибочному мнению, что в этом районе находится несколько подводных лодок). Другое, отправленное в полдень, но полученное только в 8:05 вечера, давало инструкции: «... Избегайте мысов; проходите гавани на полной скорости; держитесь курса по центру пролива. Подводные лодки у Фастнета». Лузитания теперь находилась в 370 милях к западу от Фастнета. Впоследствии Тернера обвиняли в невыполнении этих инструкций. [40] [41] В тот вечер на всем судне состоялся концерт в пользу благотворительного фонда моряков, и капитан был обязан присутствовать на мероприятии в зале первого класса. [3] : 197
Карта, показывающая перемещения RMS Lusitania и SM U-20 до затопления первой. Отмечены суда, потопленные U-20 6 и 7 мая, и ключевые географические точки. Основано на [42] и [38] .
К 05:00 7 мая «Лузитания» достигла точки в 120 морских милях (220 км) к западу-юго-западу от мыса Фастнет (у южной оконечности Ирландии), где она встретила патрульное абордажное судно «Партридж» . [43] К 06:00 наступил сильный туман, и были выставлены дополнительные наблюдатели. При входе в зону боевых действий капитан Тернер в качестве меры предосторожности спустил на воду 22 спасательные шлюпки, чтобы их можно было спустить на воду быстрее в случае необходимости. [44] Когда судно приблизилось к Ирландии, капитан Тернер приказал провести зондирование глубины и в 08:00 снизить скорость до восемнадцати узлов, затем до 15 узлов и включить туманный горн. Некоторые пассажиры были обеспокоены тем, что судно, казалось, объявляло о своем присутствии. К 10:00 туман начал рассеиваться, к полудню он сменился ярким солнечным светом над чистым гладким морем, а скорость увеличилась до 18 узлов. [3] : 200–202
Около 11:52 7 мая корабль получил еще одно предупреждение от Адмиралтейства, вероятно, в результате запроса Альфреда Бута, который был обеспокоен Лузитанией : «Подводные лодки активны в южной части Ирландского канала. Последние сообщения о них в двадцати милях к югу от легкого судна Конингбег». Бут и весь Ливерпуль получили известие о затоплениях, о которых Адмиралтейство узнало по крайней мере к 3:00 утра. [45] Тернер скорректировал свой курс на северо-восток, не зная, что это сообщение связано с событиями предыдущего дня, и, очевидно, думая, что подводные лодки, скорее всего, будут держаться открытого моря, [20] : 184 или что затопление будет безопаснее на мелководье. [46] В 13:00 было получено еще одно сообщение: «Подводная лодка в пяти милях к югу от мыса Клир движется на запад, когда будет замечена в 10:00 утра». Этот отчет был неточным, поскольку в этом месте не было ни одной подводной лодки, но создавалось впечатление, что по крайней мере одна подводная лодка благополучно миновала это место. [47]
U-20 была на исходе топлива и имела только три торпеды. В то утро видимость была плохой, и Швигер решил отправиться домой. Он погрузился в 11:00, заметив рыболовное судно, которое, по его мнению, могло быть британским патрулем, и вскоре после этого был пройден, все еще находясь под водой, судном на большой скорости. Это был крейсер Juno (1895), возвращавшийся в Квинстаун, зигзагом на своей самой высокой устойчивой скорости в 16 узлов, получив предупреждение об активности подводных лодок у Квинстауна в 07:45. Адмиралтейство посчитало эти старые крейсеры крайне уязвимыми для подводных лодок, и Швигер действительно попытался нацелиться на судно. [3] : 216 [48]
Тонущий
Иллюстрация затопления Нормана УилкинсонаРыболовное судно « Уондерер» возле затонувшей « Лузитании»
U-20 снова всплыла в 12:45, так как видимость теперь была отличной. В 13:20 что-то было замечено, и Швигера вызвали в боевую рубку: сначала показалось, что это несколько кораблей из-за количества труб и мачт, но потом это превратилось в один большой пароход, появляющийся из-за горизонта. В 13:25 субмарина погрузилась на перископную глубину 11 метров и взяла курс на перехват лайнера на своей максимальной подводной скорости 9 узлов. Когда корабли сблизились до 2 морских миль (3,7 км), Лузитания отвернулась, Швигер испугался, что потерял цель, но она снова повернула, на этот раз на почти идеальный курс, чтобы вывести ее на позицию для атаки. В 14:10, имея цель на расстоянии 700 м, он приказал выпустить одну гироскопическую торпеду, установленную на глубине трех метров. [3] : 216–217 [49] По словам Швигера, он не знал, что это за корабль, прежде чем атаковать, знал только то, что это было большое пассажирское судно. [50] За свою карьеру он совершил несколько атак, не идентифицируя свою цель, включая более позднюю атаку на RMS Hesperian , где он нарушил приказы, запрещающие атаковать пассажирские суда. [51] Швигер также неверно оценил скорость корабля, составив 20 узлов, но, к сожалению для Lusitania , это компенсировало еще одну ошибку, которую он допустил в угле атаки. Теперь торпеда была на курсе, чтобы поразить корабль примерно через минуту. [52]
На борту « Лузитании» восемнадцатилетний впередсмотрящий на носу судна Лесли Мортон заметил тонкие полосы пены, мчащиеся к кораблю. Он крикнул в мегафон : «Торпеды идут по правому борту!» , думая, что пузыри исходят от двух снарядов, а не от одного. Записи в журнале Швигера свидетельствуют о том, что он выпустил только одну торпеду. Некоторые сомневаются в обоснованности этого заявления, утверждая, что немецкое правительство впоследствии изменило опубликованную чистовую копию журнала Швигера, [3] : 416–419, но отчеты других членов экипажа U-20 подтверждают это. Записи также соответствовали перехваченным радиодонесениям, отправленным в Германию U-20 после того, как она вернулась в Северное море, до любой возможности официального сокрытия. [53]
Далее, по собственным словам Швигера, записанным в журнале U-20 :
Торпеда попадает в правый борт прямо за мостиком. Происходит необычно сильная детонация с очень сильным взрывным облаком. За взрывом торпеды, должно быть, последовал второй [котел, уголь или порох?]... Корабль немедленно останавливается и очень быстро кренится на правый борт, одновременно погружаясь носом... становится видно название Lusitania золотыми буквами. [54]
Хотя Швигер утверждает, что торпеда попала за мостик, и, таким образом, в непосредственной близости от первой трубы, показания выживших, включая капитана Тернера, давали несколько разных мест: некоторые утверждали, что это было между первой и второй трубами, другие — между третьей и четвертой. Большинство из них были примерно согласны, так как свидетели сообщили о шлейфе воды, который сбросил спасательную шлюпку № 5 со шлюпбалок, и о гейзере из стальной обшивки, угольного дыма, золы и мусора высоко над палубой, а команда, работавшая в котлах, утверждала, что они были немедленно затоплены. Это соответствовало бы описанию Швигера. [55] «Это было похоже на то, как будто молот весом в миллион тонн ударил по паровому котлу высотой в сто футов», — сказал один пассажир. Последовал второй взрыв, разнесшийся по всему кораблю, и густой серый дым начал выходить из труб и вентиляционных кожухов, которые вели глубоко в котельные. Офицер-торпедист U-20 Раймунд Вайсбах наблюдал за разрушениями через перископ судна и запомнил только, что взрыв торпеды был необычайно сильным.
Эффект от торпеды U-20 , включая водяной шлейф от взрыва
В 14:12 капитан Тернер приказал квартирмейстеру Джонстону занять позицию у штурвала судна, чтобы направить его «жестко вправо» к ирландскому побережью, что Джонстон подтвердил, но судно не удалось удержать, и оно быстро перестало реагировать на штурвал. Тернер подал сигнал реверса двигателям, чтобы остановить судно, но хотя сигнал был получен в машинном отделении, ничего нельзя было сделать. Давление пара упало с 195 фунтов на квадратный дюйм до взрыва до 50 фунтов на квадратный дюйм и упало после него, что означало, что Lusitania не могла управляться или останавливаться, чтобы противодействовать крену или высадиться на берег. [3] : 227 Радиооператор Lusitania немедленно отправил сигнал SOS , который был подтвержден береговой радиостанцией. Вскоре после этого он передал местоположение корабля, в 10 морских милях (19 км) к югу от Старого мыса Кинсейла. [3] : 228 В 14:14 отключилось электричество, погрузив пещеристое внутреннее пространство корабля во тьму. Радиосигналы продолжали поступать от аварийных батарей, но электрические лифты вышли из строя, заперев членов экипажа в переднем грузовом отсеке, которые готовили багаж к отправке на берег в Ливерпуле позже тем же вечером; именно эти моряки должны были явиться на пункты сбора, чтобы спустить спасательные шлюпки в случае затопления; двери переборок, которые были закрыты в качестве меры предосторожности перед атакой, не могли быть открыты снова, чтобы освободить застрявших людей. [3] : 238–240 С потерей питания руль также вышел из строя, что означало, что судном нельзя было управлять, чтобы противодействовать крену или самому пристать к берегу. Мало кто из свидетельств сообщает о пассажирах, застрявших в двух центральных лифтах, хотя один пассажир салона утверждал, что видел, как лифты застряли между шлюпочной палубой и палубой ниже, проходя через вход первого класса.
Примерно через минуту после отключения электроэнергии капитан Тернер отдал приказ покинуть корабль. Вода затопила продольные отсеки правого борта корабля, вызвав крен в 15 градусов на правый борт. Через шесть минут после атаки бак « Лузитании » начал погружаться под воду.
Сильный правый крен Lusitania осложнил спуск ее спасательных шлюпок. Через десять минут после попадания торпеды, когда она достаточно замедлилась, чтобы начать спускать шлюпки на воду, спасательные шлюпки по правому борту слишком сильно развернулись, чтобы безопасно подняться на борт. [56] Хотя все еще можно было сесть на спасательные шлюпки по левому борту, их спуск представлял собой другую проблему. Как было типично для того периода, листы корпуса Lusitania были заклепаны , и когда спасательные шлюпки спускались, они тащили за собой заклепки высотой в дюйм, что грозило серьезно повредить или опрокинуть лодки до того, как они приземлятся на воду.
На фотографии 1914 года показаны дополнительные складные спасательные шлюпки, добавленные к кораблю.
Многие спасательные шлюпки перевернулись во время погрузки или спуска, вылив пассажиров в море, а другие были перевернуты движением судна, когда они ударились о воду. Утверждалось [57] , что некоторые шлюпки из-за халатности некоторых офицеров рухнули на палубу, раздавив других пассажиров и соскользнув вниз к мостику. Это оспаривалось показаниями пассажиров и экипажа. [58] Некоторые неподготовленные члены экипажа теряли контроль над ручными канатами, используемыми для спуска спасательных шлюпок, пытаясь спустить шлюпки в океан, выливая их пассажиров в море. Другие переворачивались при спуске, когда некоторые паникующие люди прыгали в шлюпку. У Лузитании было 48 спасательных шлюпок, более чем достаточно для всего экипажа и пассажиров, но только 6 были успешно спущены, все с правого борта. Спасательная шлюпка 1 перевернулась во время спуска, вылив своих первоначальных пассажиров в море, но ей удалось вскоре выровняться и позже она была заполнена людьми из воды. Спасательные шлюпки 9 (5 человек на борту) и 11 (7 человек на борту) сумели благополучно достичь воды с несколькими людьми, но обе позже подобрали много пловцов. Спасательные шлюпки 13 и 15 также благополучно достигли воды, перегруженные примерно 150 людьми. Наконец, спасательная шлюпка 21 (52 человека на борту) благополучно достигла воды и покинула судно за несколько минут до его окончательного погружения. Несколько ее складных спасательных шлюпок смыло с ее палубы, когда она затонула, и обеспечило плавучесть некоторым выжившим.
Две спасательные шлюпки с левого борта также освободили судно. Спасательная шлюпка 14 (11 человек на борту) была спущена и спущена на воду благополучно, но поскольку пробка для шлюпки не была установлена, она наполнилась морской водой и затонула почти сразу после того, как достигла воды. Позже спасательная шлюпка 2 уплыла от судна с новыми пассажирами (предыдущие вылились в море, когда они перевернули лодку) после того, как они сняли веревку и одну из «щупальцеобразных» стоек дымохода судна. Они отплыли незадолго до того, как судно затонуло.
По словам Швигера, он наблюдал панику и беспорядок на правом борту палубы через перископ U-20 , и к 14:25 он опустил перископ и направился в море. [59] Позже в тот же день он попытался торпедировать американский танкер Narragansett (торпеда прошла мимо). Впоследствии субмарина направилась на север вдоль западного побережья Ирландии и проследовала в Вильгельмсхафен. [38] [50] Швигер в конечном итоге погиб 5 сентября 1917 года, когда его субмарина U-88 налетела на британскую мину к северу от Терсхеллинга и погибла со всем экипажем.
Однако выжившие пассажиры на левом борту палубы рисуют более спокойную картину. Многие, включая автора Чарльза Лориата, опубликовавшего свой отчет о катастрофе, утверждали, что несколько пассажиров забрались в первые спасательные шлюпки по левому борту, прежде чем им приказал выйти штаб-капитан Джеймс Андерсон, который провозгласил: «Этот корабль не утонет» и заверил находящихся поблизости, что лайнер «коснулся дна» и останется на плаву. На самом деле он приказал экипажу подождать и заполнить балластные цистерны левого борта «Лузитании » морской водой, чтобы выровнять дифферент судна и безопасно спустить спасательные шлюпки. В результате было спущено на воду несколько шлюпок по левому борту, ни одна из которых не находилась под наблюдением Андерсона.
След Лузитании . Вид на пострадавших и выживших в воде и спасательных шлюпках. Картина Уильяма Лайонела Уайли
Второй взрыв заставил пассажиров поверить, что U-20 во второй раз торпедировала «Лузитанию».
Лузитания тонет, а ирландские рыбаки спешат на помощь. На самом деле, спуск спасательных шлюпок был более хаотичным
Капитан Тернер , фотография сделана 11 мая 1915 года, через четыре дня после затопления.
Captain Turner was on the deck near the bridge clutching the ship's logbook and charts when a wave swept upward towards the bridge and the rest of the ship's forward superstructure, knocking him overboard into the sea. He managed to swim and find a chair floating in the water which he clung to. He survived, having been pulled unconscious from the water after spending three hours there. Lusitania's bow slammed into the bottom about 100 metres (330 ft) below at a shallow angle because of her forward momentum as she sank. Along the way, some boilers exploded and the ship returned briefly to an even keel. Turner's last navigational fix had been only two minutes before the torpedoing, and he was able to remember the ship's speed and bearing at the moment of the sinking. This was accurate enough to locate the wreck after the war. The ship travelled about two nautical miles (4 km) from the time of the torpedoing to her final resting place, leaving a trail of debris and people behind. After her bow sank completely, Lusitania's stern rose out of the water, enough for her propellers to be seen, and went under. As the tips of Lusitania's four, 70-foot-tall funnels dipped beneath the surface, they formed whirlpools which dragged nearby swimmers down with the ship. Her masts and rigging were the last to disappear.
Lusitania sank in only 18 minutes, at a distance of 11.5 nautical miles (21 km) off the Old Head of Kinsale. Despite being relatively close to shore, it took several hours for help to arrive from the Irish coast. By the time help arrived, however, many in the 52 °F (11 °C) water had succumbed to the cold. By the days' end, 767 passengers and crew from Lusitania had been rescued and landed at Queenstown, though 4 died shortly after. The final death toll for the disaster came to a catastrophic number. Of the 1,960 aboard Lusitania at the time of her sinking, 1,197 (61%) had been lost, including 94 children and ~128 Americans[4] (though the official toll at the time gave slightly different numbers).[1] In the days following the disaster, the Cunard line offered local fishermen and sea merchants a cash reward for the bodies floating all throughout the Irish Sea, some floating as far away as the Welsh coast. Only 289 bodies were recovered, 65 of which were never identified. The bodies of many of the victims were buried at either Queenstown, where 148 bodies were interred in the Old Church Cemetery,[60] or the Church of St Multose in Kinsale, but the bodies of the remaining 885 victims were never recovered.
One story—an urban legend—states that when Lieutenant Schwieger of U-20 gave the order to fire, his quartermaster, Charles Voegele, would not take part in an attack on women and children, and refused to pass on the order to the torpedo room – a decision for which he was court-martialed and imprisoned at Kiel until the end of the war.[61] This rumour persisted from 1972, when the French daily paper Le Monde published a letter to the editor.[62][63] However, Voegele was the U-20's electrician at the time of the torpedoing, not the quartermaster. Despite seemingly putting an end to this rumor, Voegele's alleged hesitation was depicted in the torpedoing scene of the 2007 docudrama Sinking of the Lusitania: Terror at Sea.
Notable passengers
"Lusitania Sinking, the Greatest of Ocean Tragedies"
Charles Frohman, 58. American theatre impresario and one of four American "men of world wide prominence" named in the film The Sinking of the Lusitania (1918).
Elbert Hubbard, 58. American philosopher, writer and Roycroft founder, and one of four American "men of world wide prominence" named in the film The Sinking of the Lusitania (1918).
Alice Moore Hubbard, 53. Author and woman's rights activist, wife of Elbert Hubbard.
Alfred Gwynne Vanderbilt, 37. Sportsman, millionaire, member of the Vanderbilt family, and one of four American "men of world wide prominence" named in the 1918 film The Sinking of the Lusitania – last seen fastening a life vest onto a woman holding a baby.
Lothrop Withington, 59. American genealogist, historian and book editor, and famous singer.
Official inquiries
Cork county coroner
On 8 May, the local county coroner John Hogan opened an inquest in Kinsale into the deaths of two males and three females whose bodies had been brought ashore by a local boat, Heron. Most of the survivors (and dead) had been taken to Queenstown instead of Kinsale, which was closer. On 10 May Captain Turner gave evidence as to the events of the sinking where he described that the ship had been struck by one torpedo between the third and fourth funnels. This had been followed immediately by a second explosion. He acknowledged receiving general warnings about submarines, but had not been informed of the sinking of Earl of Lathom. He stated that he had received other instructions from the Admiralty which he had carried out but was not permitted to discuss. The coroner brought in a verdict that the deceased had drowned following an attack on an unarmed non-combatant vessel contrary to international law. Half an hour after the inquest had concluded and its results given to the press, the Crown Solicitor for Cork, Harry Wynne, arrived with instructions to halt it. Captain Turner was not to give evidence and no statements should be made about any instructions given to shipping about avoiding submarines.[3]: 330–332
Board of Trade investigation
Lord Mersey, wreck commissioner presiding over the inquiry.
The formal Board of Trade investigation into the sinking was presided over by Wreck Commissioner Lord Mersey and took place in the Westminster Central Hall from 15 to 18 June 1915 with further sessions at the Westminster Palace Hotel on 1 July and Caxton Hall on 17 July. Lord Mersey had a background in commercial rather than maritime law but had presided over a number of important maritime investigations, including that into the loss of Titanic. He was assisted by four assessors, Admiral Sir Frederick Inglefield, Lieutenant Commander Hearn and two merchant navy captains, D. Davies and J. Spedding. The Attorney General, Sir Edward Carson, represented the Board of Trade, assisted by the Solicitor General, F. E. Smith. Butler Aspinall, who had represented the Board of Trade at the Titanic inquiry, was retained to represent Cunard. A total of 36 witnesses were called, Lord Mersey querying why more of the survivors would not be giving evidence. Most of the sessions were public but two on 15 and 18 June were held in camera when evidence regarding navigation of the ship was presented.[67]
Statements were collected from all the crew. These were all written out for presentation to the inquiry on standard forms in identical handwriting with similar phrasing. Quartermaster Johnston later described that pressure had been placed upon him to be loyal to the company, and that it had been suggested to him it would help the case if two torpedoes had struck the ship, rather than the one which he described. Giving evidence to the tribunal he was not asked about torpedoes. Other witnesses who claimed that only one torpedo had been involved were refused permission to testify. In contrast to his statement at the inquest, Captain Turner stated that two torpedoes had struck the ship, not one.[3]: 363 In an interview in 1933, Turner reverted to his original statement that there had been only one torpedo.[3]: 457 Most witnesses said there had been two, but a couple said three, possibly involving a second submarine. Clement Edwards, representing the seamen's union, attempted to introduce evidence about which watertight compartments had been involved but was prevented from doing so by Lord Mersey.[3]: 367
Richard Webb, director of the Trade Division at the time.
It was during the closed hearings that the Admiralty tried to lay the blame on Captain Turner, their intended line being that Turner had been negligent. The roots of this view began in the first reports about the sinking from Vice-Admiral Coke commanding the Navy at Queenstown. He reported that "ship was especially warned that submarines were active on south coast and to keep mid-channel course avoiding headlands also position of submarine off Cape Clear at 10:00 was communicated by W/T to her". Captain Webb, Director of the Trade Division, began to prepare a dossier of signals sent to Lusitania which Turner may have failed to observe. First Sea Lord Fisher noted on one document submitted by Webb for review: "As the Cunard company would not have employed an incompetent man its a certainty that Captain Turner is not a fool but a knave. I hope that Turner will be arrested immediately after the enquiry whatever the verdict". First Lord Winston Churchill noted: "I consider the Admiralty's case against Turner should be pressed by a skilful counsel and that Captain Webb should attend as a witness, if not employed as an assessor. We will pursue the captain without check". In the event, both Churchill and Fisher were replaced in their positions before the enquiry because of the failures of the Gallipoli campaign.[68]
Part of the proceedings turned on the question of proper evasive tactics against submarines. It was put to Captain Turner that he had failed to comply with Admiralty instructions to travel at high speed, maintain a zig-zag course and keep away from shore. Lusitania had slowed to 15 knots at one point because of fog, but had otherwise maintained 18 knots passing Ireland. 18 knots was faster than all but nine other ships in the British merchant fleet could achieve and was comfortably faster than the submarine. At the time, no ship had been torpedoed travelling at more than 15 knots. Although he might have achieved 21 knots and had given orders to raise steam ready to do so, he was also under orders to time his arrival at Liverpool for high tide so that the ship would not have to wait to enter port. Thus, he chose to travel more slowly.
However, Turner could have also accomplished his desired arrival time at high speed by zig-zagging, albeit at a higher cost in fuel. Naval instructions about zig-zagging were read to the captain, who confirmed that he had received them, though later added that they did not appear to be as he recollected. This was unsurprising, since the general regulations quoted had been approved only on 25 April, after Lusitania's last arrival in New York, and started distribution on 13 May, after she sank,[69] though Turner's response indicated that he had received some earlier specific instructions on 16 April. Turner expressed that his interpretation of the advice he did receive was to zig-zag once submarines were sighted, which would be useless in the case of a surprise submerged attack.[41]
Lighthouse at the Old Head of Kinsale. Turner had approached this point to obtain bearings before his ship was sunk.
Although the Admiralty instructed ships to keep well offshore, it was also not clear how far this meant. The Admiralty claimed that Turner had only been 8 nautical miles (15 km) away, while his actual distance when hit was thirteen nautical miles (24 km). Both were still substantially more distant than the 2 nautical miles (3.7 km) distant course ships would have taken during peacetime, which ironically also would have caused Lusitania to miss the submarine.[41] However, Turner had been intent on bringing the ship far closer. Turner stated that he had discussed the matter of what course the ship should take with his two most senior officers, Captain Anderson and Chief Officer Piper, neither of whom survived. The three had agreed that the Admiralty warning of "submarine activity 20 miles [37 km] south of Coningbeg" effectively overrode other Admiralty advice to keep to 'mid channel', which was where he believed the submarines to be. He had, therefore, approached the Head of Kinsale to obtain a bearing, intending to bring the ship closer to land and then take a course north of the reported submarine a mere half mile away from shore. It was while steering a straight course to obtain this bearing that the attack came.[70][71]
At one point in the proceedings, Smith attempted to press a point he was making, by quoting from a signal sent to British ships. Lord Mersey queried which message this was, and it transpired that the message in question existed in the version of evidence given to Smith by the Board of Trade Solicitor, Sir Ellis Cunliffe, but not in versions given to others. Cunliffe explained the discrepancy by saying that different versions of the papers had been prepared for use, depending whether the enquiry had been in camera or not, but the message quoted appeared never to have existed. Lord Mersey observed that it was his job to get at the truth, and thereafter became more critical of Admiralty evidence.[72]
A survivor of the sinking. Pictured 25 May 1915
An additional hearing took place on 1 July, at the insistence of Joseph Marichal, who was threatening to sue Cunard for their poor handling of the disaster. He testified that the second explosion had sounded to him like the rattling of machine gun fire and appeared to be below the second class dining room at the rear of the ship where he had been seated. Information about Marechal's background was sought out by the British government and then distorted and leaked to the press so as to discredit him.[3]: 367–369 The rifle cartridges Marichal alluded to were mentioned during the case, with Lord Mersey stating that "the 5,000 cases of ammunition on board were 50 yards away from where the torpedo struck the ship, there were no other explosives on board". All had agreed they could not have caused the second explosion.[73]
In the end, Captain Turner, the Cunard Company, and the Royal Navy were absolved of any negligence, and all blame was placed on the German government. Lord Mersey found that Turner did deviate from Admiralty instructions which may have saved the ship, but such instructions were suggestions more than orders. Thus, the captain had "exercised his judgment for the best" and that the blame for the disaster "must rest solely with those who plotted and with those who committed the crime".[74][75]
According to Simpson, Lord Mersey later told his children: "The Lusitania case was a damned, dirty business!"[76] While a public report[75] was presented to Parliament and reported on by the British press,[77] Simpson suggests the existence of a fuller, secret report, which might exist amongst Lord Mersey's private papers after his death, but has since proved untraceable. Bailey and Ryan are of the opinion that Mersey decided to "whitewash" Turner, having indicated suspicion of mismanagement from Turner and Cunard in his questioning. Admiral Inglefield had suggested he blame Turner for disobeying Admiralty orders, but Mersey had responded that this may help strengthen Germany's case. When the verdict came, it was met with anger and surprise from Lusitania survivors.[78]
American court proceedings
Judge Julius Mayer, presiding.
In the United States, 67 claims for compensation were lodged against Cunard, which were all heard together in 1918 before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Judge Julius Mayer, presided over the case: he had previously presided over the case brought following the loss of the Titanic, where he had ruled in favour of the shipping company. Mayer was a conservative who was considered a safe pair of hands with matters of national interest, and whose favourite remark to lawyers was to "come to the point". The case was to be heard without a jury. The two sides agreed beforehand that no question would be raised regarding whether Lusitania had been armed or carrying troops or ammunition. Thirty-three witnesses who could not travel to the US gave statements in England to Commissioner R. V. Wynne. Evidence produced in open court for the Mersey investigation was considered, but evidence from the British closed sessions was not. The Defence of the Realm Act was invoked so that British witnesses could not give evidence on any subject it covered. Statements had been collected in Queenstown after the sinking by the American Consul, Wesley Frost, but these were not produced.[3]: 413–414
Captain Turner gave evidence in Britain and now gave a more spirited defence of his actions. He argued that up until the time of the sinking he had no reason to think that zig-zagging in a fast ship would help. Indeed, that he had since commanded another ship which was sunk while zig-zagging. His position was supported by evidence from other captains, who said that prior to the sinking of Lusitania no merchant ships zig-zagged. Turner had argued that maintaining a steady course for 30 minutes was necessary to take a four-point bearing and precisely confirm the ship's position, but on this point he received less support, with other captains arguing a two-point bearing could have been taken in five minutes and would have been sufficiently accurate.
Many witnesses testified that portholes across the ship had been open at the time of the sinking, and an expert witness confirmed that such a porthole three feet under water would let in four tons of water per minute. Testimony varied on how many torpedoes there had been, and whether the strike occurred between the first and second funnel, or third and fourth. The nature of the official cargo was considered, but experts considered that under no conditions could the cargo have exploded. A record exists that Crewman Jack Roper wrote to Cunard in 1919 requesting expenses for his testimony in accord with the line indicated by Cunard.[3]: 415–416
The decision was rendered on 23 August 1918. Mayer's judgement was that "the cause of the sinking was the illegal act of the Imperial German Government", that two torpedoes had been involved, that the captain had acted properly and emergency procedures had been up to the standard then expected. He ruled that further claims for compensation should be addressed to the German government (which eventually paid $2.5 million in 1925).
International reaction
German
German propaganda postcard of Lusitania. The torpedo is incorrectly depicted as hitting the port side of ship. Next to the Kaiserliche Marine ensign is shown Grand Admiral Tirpitz, major proponent of submarine warfare.
Another German propaganda postcard. U-20 is depicted incorrectly as being on the surface and thus is spotted by Lusitania.
Original Goetz propaganda medal. Lusitania is shown with exaggerated armaments, including aircraft and cannon on board. The wrong date of "5 Mai" is given.
German commemorative medal by Ludwig Gies, 1915. Shows Lusitania packed with people, lowering lifeboats.
An unsympathetic later medal, also by Gies. Shows ship as a monster packed with weapons, mouth full of coins.
On 8 May Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, the former German Colonial Secretary and representative of the German Red Cross, made a statement in Cleveland, Ohio, in which he attempted to justify the sinking of Lusitania. Described by the New York Times as "the Kaiser's official mouthpiece", Dernburg was in fact acting as a private citizen with no official role in the German Foreign office, but had organised a New York "Press Bureau" to spread German propaganda since 1914.[79] Dernburg said that because Lusitania "carried contraband of war" and also because she "was classed as an auxiliary cruiser" Germany had had a right to destroy her regardless of any passengers aboard. Dernburg further said that the warnings given by the German Embassy before her sailing, plus the 18 February note declaring the existence of "war zones" relieved Germany of any responsibility for the deaths of the American citizens aboard. He referred to the ammunition and military goods declared on Lusitania's manifest and said that "vessels of that kind" could be seized and destroyed under the Hague rules without any respect to a war zone.[80]
The following day the German government issued an official communication regarding the sinking in which it said that the Cunard linerLusitania "was yesterday torpedoed by a German submarine and sank", that Lusitania "was naturally armed with guns, as were recently most of the English mercantile steamers"[81] and that "as is well known here, she had large quantities of war material in her cargo". This would be the official German line for the immediate aftermath.[82]
The sinking was severely criticised by and met with disapproval in Turkey and Austria-Hungary,[83] while in the German press, the sinking was deplored by Vorwärts, the daily newspaper of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and also by Captain Persius, an outspoken naval critic who wrote for the Berliner Tageblatt.[84] However much of the rest of the press approved of the sinking.[85] One Catholic Centre Party newspaper, the Kölnische Volkszeitung [de], stated: "The sinking of the giant English steamship is a success of moral significance which is still greater than material success. With joyful pride we contemplate this latest deed of our Navy. It will not be the last. The English wish to abandon the German people to death by starvation. We are more humane. We simply sank an English ship with passengers who, at their own risk and responsibility, entered the zone of operations."[86] The Frankfurter Zeitung wrote: "For the Germany Navy the sinking of the Lusitania means an extraordinary success. Its destruction demolished the last fable with which the people of England consoled themselves."[87]
In a 13 July report on conditions in Germany, US Ambassador James W. Gerard reported that due to the highly effective propaganda efforts of the Admiralty press bureau:
As to Germany’s war methods, they have the full approval of the people; the sinking of the Lusitania was universally approved, and even men like Von Gwinner, head of the German Bank, say they will treat the Mauretania in the same way if she comes out.
— James W. Gerard[88], 13 July 1915
Propaganda medals were made by a number of artists, including Ludwig Gies and in August 1915, the Munichmedallist and sculptor Karl Goetz (Medailleur) [de] (1875–1950).[89] The latter privately struck a small run of medals as a limited-circulation satirical attack (fewer than 500 were struck) on the Cunard Line for trying to continue business as usual during wartime. Goetz blamed both the British government and the Cunard Line for allowing Lusitania to sail despite the German embassy's warnings.[90] Popular demand led to many unauthorised copies being made. One side of the popular medal showed Lusitania sinking laden with guns (incorrectly depicted sinking stern first) with the motto "KEINE BANNWARE!" ("NO CONTRABAND!"), while the reverse showed a skeleton selling Cunard tickets with the motto "Geschäft Über Alles" ("Business Above All").[91]
Goetz had put an incorrect date for the sinking on the medal, an error he later blamed on a mistake in a newspaper story about the sinking: instead of 7 May, he had put "5. Mai", two days before the actual sinking. Not realising his error, Goetz made copies of the medal and sold them in Munich and also to some numismatic dealers with whom he conducted business. This led to conspiracy theories.[92] Realising his mistake, Goetz issued a corrected medal with the date of "7. Mai".
American
The New York Times article expressed the immediate recognition of the serious implications of the sinking, this lead story on 8 May having a section (below what is pictured here) titled "Nation's Course in Doubt".[93]
Of the 159 US citizens aboard Lusitania, over a hundred[4] lost their lives, and there was massive outrage in America, The Nation calling it "a deed for which a Hun would blush, a Turk be ashamed, and a Barbary pirate apologize".[94] Dernburg's comments heightened public indignation, leading to German ambassador Bernstorff to advise him to leave.[95]
US President Woodrow Wilson urged restraint. He said at Philadelphia on 10 May 1915:
There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right.[94]
The phrase "too proud to fight" then became mocked by pro-war and pro-Entente groups, as well as factions in Germany who believed there was no real threat of America going to war.[96]
US authorities rebutted German claims. While it was true that Lusitania had been fitted with gun mounts as part of government loan requirements during her construction, enabling rapid conversion into an Armed Merchant Cruiser (AMC), and was listed officially as a "Royal Naval Reserve Merchant Cruiser", the guns themselves were never fitted.[9] The great majority of British merchant ships were not armed, and indeed ships that were called up as Auxiliary Cruisers such as the SS Orduña had to at times be fitted with fake weaponry.[97]
Thus, Dudley Field Malone, Collector of the Port of New York, issued an official denial to the German charges, saying that Lusitania had been inspected before her departure and no guns were found, mounted or unmounted. Malone stated that no merchant ship would have been allowed to arm itself in the Port and leave the harbour. Assistant Manager of the Cunard Line, Herman Winter, denied the charge that she carried munitions:
She had aboard 4,200 cases of cartridges, but they were cartridges for small arms, packed in separate cases... they certainly do not come under the classification of ammunition. The United States authorities would not permit us to carry ammunition, classified as such by the military authorities, on a passenger liner. For years we have been sending small-arms cartridges abroad on the Lusitania.[98]
In addition to the rifle cartridges, Lusitania carried also 1,250 cases of empty shells, and 18 cases of non-explosive fuses,[99] all of which were listed in her manifest.[100] However, US law revolved around the safety cargo posed to passengers and not Germany's strategic needs. Thus Winter's statement was in the context of US testing of small arms ammunition that found them to be "non-explosive in bulk", leading to a 1911 ruling that such ammunition can be transported without restriction on passenger ships, unlike explosives "likely to endanger the health or lives of the passengers or the safety of the vessel."[101]
Wilson, Lansing and Bryan
When Germany began its submarine campaign against Britain, Wilson had warned that the US would hold the German government strictly accountable for any violations of American rights.[102] On 1 May, in response to Bernstorff's advert, he had stated that "no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed" could be accepted as a legitimate excuse for that act.[103]
Robert Lansing would become US Secretary of State due to the crisis.
During the weeks after the sinking, the issue was hotly debated within the administration. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan urged compromise and restraint. The US, he believed, should try to persuade the British to abandon their interdiction of foodstuffs and limit their mine-laying operations at the same time as the Germans were persuaded to curtail their submarine campaign. He also suggested that the US government issue an explicit warning against US citizens travelling on any belligerent ships, and ban contraband from being carried on passenger vessels.
In contrast, Counselor Robert Lansing advised Wilson to adhere to the "strict accountability" line. He first doubted that information about the cargo of Lusitania had actually been communicated to the submarine making the attack. But to Lansing, who had helped found the American Society of International Law, the issue was about principle, not facts. All that mattered was the German responsibility for the safety of the unresisting crew and passengers of the ship. Once it was confirmed that the ship was not armed and was attacked by surprise, no warning or strategic justification can allow the violation of "the principles of law and humanity". The US was already committed to this approach, had never previously warned passengers to not travel on British ships and saying so now would be an abandonment of the government's responsibility to protect its citizens.[104]
Despite being sympathetic to Bryan's antiwar feelings, Wilson found Lansing's arguments "unanswerable". Thus he resolved to insist that the German government must apologise for the sinking, compensate US victims, and promise to avoid any similar occurrence in the future.[105][106] Wilson made his position clear in three notes to the German government issued on 13 May, 9 June, and 21 July.
"A letter from the president of the United States". Contemporary US political cartoon
The first note, (citing attacks on 3 other ships: the Falaba, the Cushing, and the Gulflight) affirmed the right of Americans to travel as passengers on merchant ships of any nationality, reaffirmed the doctrine of strict accountability. As the Germans were claiming that it was impossible to conduct submarine warfare against merchant vessels "without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative", "manifestly, submarines cannot be used against merchantmen".[107] Bryan discredited himself when he told Austro-Hungarian ambassador Konstantin Dumba that the American protest was only for the benefit of US public opinion and its sharp tone should be disregarded.[108] As a result, a defensive German response came on 28 May.
In the second note, in a reply to the German response, Wilson flatly rejected the German defenses. The vessel was not armed, the cargo was legal under American law, and all these questions were immaterial as to the core issue – the means of the ship's destruction.
Whatever be the other facts regarding the Lusitania, the principle fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or warning, and that men, women and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare.
The fact that more than one hundred American citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests.
The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority.
Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy. This principle the Government of the United States understands the explicit instructions issued on August 3, 1914, by the Imperial German Admiralty to its commanders at sea to have recognized and embodied, as do the naval codes of all other nations, and upon it every traveler and seaman had a right to depend.
It is upon this principle of humanity as well as upon the law founded upon this principle that the United States must stand.
— President Wilson[109][110]
Bryan considered the second note too provocative and refused to sign, and so resigned as Secretary of State. He was replaced by Lansing. Lansing later said in his memoirs that due to the tragedy he always had the "conviction that we [the United States] would ultimately become the ally of Britain".
In the third note, of 21 July, in reply to a more conciliatory German note on 12 July, Wilson (advised by Lansing) made clear that the US considered British transgressions of neutral rights to be more minor in degree, and issued an ultimatum to the effect that the US would regard any subsequent sinkings as "deliberately unfriendly". The note however indicated that Wilson would accept submarine warfare if it followed the "accepted practice of regulated warfare", observing that much of German submarine attacks had been conducted under the established cruiser rules anyway.[111][112] Thus, while the American public and leadership were not ready for war, a line in the sand had been drawn as a result of the sinking of Lusitania. Later key crises related to the sinking of the SS Arabic (1902) and the Sussex incident.
German policy reversal
While outwardly Germany conducted a propaganda skirmish, internally there had long been a faction opposed to the new submarine war. Ambassador Bernstorff himself had privately concluded that the campaign was of questionable legality and against Germany's best interests. Contrary to Germany's official defenses, Bernstorff believed that the Lusitania could not have been targeted specifically, and that it was "obviously sound policy to refrain as far as possible from any attack on passenger ships".[27] Bernstorff saw his role as preserving diplomatic relations with the US "under all circumstances", and frequently acted without instruction from Berlin.[113]
Now remember what I told you. Newspaper cartoon by Oscar Cesare commenting on German Foreign Office-led restrictions on submarine warfare, 1915–1916.
Within Germany there was a fierce debate between German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, and pro-submarine naval officials like Tirpitz and Gustav Bachmann. Tirpitz, who saw the Americans as no threat, had pushed for the official German line on the munitions issue, focusing on inciting German public opinion at the expense of the relationship with the US.[87] The Chancellor enlisted the help of Army Chief of Staff Erich von Falkenhayn, who advised the Kaiser on the danger a break with the Americans would pose. The Kaiser thus ordered on 6 June that secret directives be sent that rescinded Bachmann's order to deliberately target enemy passenger vessels and stated that deliberate attacks on large ocean liners would cease. The admirals had also counted on "accidentally" sinking a few neutral ships to deter the others, but now, if the nationality of a ship is in doubt, attacks should be aborted. Tirpitz and Bachmann offered their resignations, but they were rejected by the Kaiser. To preserve the prestige of the German military, not even Ambassador Bernstorff was told.[114]
Just like that, 1917 cartoon depicting Wilhelm II ripping apart Germany's promises to "abandon ruthless submarine policy"
Nevertheless, passenger ships continued to be attacked. The liner SS Arabic (1902) was sunk on 19 August. The ship was sailing outward from Britain, and so clearly not transporting contraband of any sort, further angering the Americans. With increasing evidence of the ineffectiveness of the U-boat campaign, which was originally promised to force the British to the negotiating table in six weeks, Bethmann Hollweg petitioned the Kaiser to publicly forbid attacks without warning against all passenger ships. He said the Germans should work with the Americans, pledging to limit submarines to cruiser rules if the British adopt the Declaration of London and thus loosen the blockade. There was once again disagreement over this move from the navy's admirals (headed by Alfred von Tirpitz), who had no interest in the Declaration if it would prevent them from using submarines fully. On 27 August, Falkenhayn and anxious messages from Bernstorff persuaded Kaiser Wilhelm II to endorse the Chancellor's solution.[115] Bachmann was forced to resign, Tirpitz lost direct access to the Kaiser, and the end of unrestricted submarine warfare against passenger ships was made public to the Americans on 1 September.[116][117]
As the German government was pondering other orders, on 18 September the new head of the Admiralty Staff, Henning von Holtzendorff, rendered these arrangements moot by giving an order on his own authority: all U-boats operating in the English Channel and off the west coast of the United Kingdom were recalled, and the U-boat war would continue only in the North sea, where it would be conducted under the Prize Law rules.[116] Thus, Pohl's U-boat experiment was called off entirely.[115] This would be the situation until the end of the following February, where a brief intensification of U-boat commerce attacks would lead to the attack on the SS Sussex on 24 March 1916, and the Sussex Pledge to adhere only to cruiser rules.[118]
At the end of January 1917 the German Government announced it would now conduct full unrestricted submarine warfare, deliberately breaking its prior promises. Once again, Woodrow Wilson was furious and on 6 April 1917 the United States Congress followed Wilson's request to declare war on Germany. US buildup of participation was at first slow, but during the German spring offensive in March 1918, which at first went well for the Germans with the Allies barely holding the lines, was reversed with the arrival by April 1918 of two million American troops.[119]
British
Take Up the Sword of Justice, a UK propaganda poster with Lusitania in the background
The Freedom of the Seas. From the Hun Point of View British propaganda poster
Remember Always, Nothing German, First World War propaganda stamp
British replica of the Goetz Lusitania medal. Unlike the original Goetz medals which were sand-cast from bronze, the British copies were of diecast iron and were of poorer quality. The English version was altered to read 'May' rather than 'Mai', and originals usually have "KGoetz" on the edge.[91]
The British press highlighted the savagery of the Germans, condemning Schwieger as a war criminal. Thanks to the Defence of the Realm Act, matters relating to the ship's cargo were censored.[120] References to the Lusitania appeared heavily in propaganda, and helped motivate the later Baralong incidents. According to Kurt Hahn, the sinking was a decisive turning point in the collective English attitude towards Germany.[121]
According to US Ambassador Walter Hines Page, the British did not want US military help, but they felt America "falls short morally" in insufficiently condemning German methods and character. America thus should at least break relations with German temporarily.[122] British propaganda was thus also aimed at America, with the sinking concurrent with the Bryce report on German atrocities. One over-enthusiastic propagandist's fabricated story was circulated that in some regions of Germany, schoolchildren were given a holiday to celebrate the sinking of Lusitania. This story was so effective that James W. Gerard, the US ambassador to Germany, recounted it being told in his memoir of his time in Germany, Face to Face with Kaiserism (1918), though without vouching for its validity.[123]
Another ploy was the reproduction of the Goetz medal, which was done by department store entrepreneur Harry Gordon Selfridge at the behest of Lord Newton, in charge of Propaganda at the Foreign Office in 1916.[124] The replica medals were produced in an attractive case and were sold for a shilling apiece. On the cases it was stated that the medals had been distributed in Germany "to commemorate the sinking of Lusitania" and they came with a propaganda leaflet which denounced the Germans and used the medal's incorrect date (5 May) to incorrectly claim that the sinking of Lusitania was premeditated, rather than just being incident to Germany's larger plan to sink any ship in a combat zone without warning. The head of the Lusitania Souvenir Medal Committee later estimated that 250,000 were sold, proceeds being given to the Red Cross and St Dunstan's Blinded Soldiers and Sailors Hostel.[125][126] Many popular magazines and newspapers ran photographs of the replica or the original, and it was falsely claimed that it had been awarded to the crew of the U-boat.[123][127]
Reverse of the Baudichon medal
The Bavarian government, alarmed at the strong worldwide reaction to Goetz's work, suppressed further production of the original medal and ordered confiscation in April 1917. After the war Goetz expressed his regret that his work had been the cause of increasing anti-German feelings, but it remains a celebrated propaganda act. After the war, in around 1920, the French medallist René Baudichon created a counterblast to the Goetz medal. The Baudichon medal is in bronze, 54 millimetres (2.1 in) diameter and weighs 79.51 grams (2.805 oz). The obverse shows Liberty as depicted on the Statue of Liberty but holding a raised sword and rising from a stormy sea. Behind her the sun is breaking through clouds and six ships are steaming. Signed R Baudichon. Legend: Ultrix America Juris, 1917 U.S.A 1918 (America avenger of right). The reverse shows a view of the starboard quarter of the Lusitania correctly depicted sinking bow first. In the foreground there is a capsized lifeboat. The upper field shows a child drowning, head, hands and feet above the water; RB monogram. Legend: Lusitania May 7, 1915.[128]
Last survivor
Young Barbara McDermott, second-to-last survivor, with Assistant Purser William Harkness
The last survivor was Audrey Warren Lawson-Johnston (née Pearl), who was born in New York City on 15 February 1915. She was the fourth of six children (the youngest two born after the disaster) born to Major Frederic "Frank" Warren Pearl (1869–1952) and Amy Lea (née Duncan; 1880–1964). She was only three months old when she boarded Lusitania in New York with her parents, three siblings, and two nurses – and due to her age had no first hand recollection of the disaster. She and her brother Stuart (age 5) were saved by their British nursemaid Alice Maud Lines, then 18 years old, who jumped off the boat deck and escaped in a lifeboat. Her parents also survived, but her sisters Amy (age 3) and Susan (age 14 months) died.[129] Pearl married Hugh de Beauchamp Lawson-Johnston, second son of George Lawson Johnston, 1st Baron Luke, on 18 July 1946. They had three children and lived in Melchbourne, Bedfordshire. Hugh was Sheriff of Bedfordshire in 1961.[130] Johnston gifted an inshore lifeboat, Amy Lea, to New Quay Lifeboat Station in 2004 in memory of her mother. Audrey Johnston died on 11 January 2011, at age 95.[131]
Cultural legacy
Film
American cartoonist Winsor McCay spent nearly two years making The Sinking of the Lusitania (1918), at the time the longest animated film, and the oldest existing animated documentary
There is no footage of the sinking.
Animation pioneer Winsor McCay spent nearly two years animating the disaster for his film The Sinking of the Lusitania (1918). At 12 minutes, it was the longest animated film on record at the time. It was also the earliest-known dramatic animation.[132]
The docudrama Sinking of the Lusitania: Terror at Sea (2007) depicts the last voyage of the Lusitania and the political and military decisions that led to the sinking.
The National Geographic documentary Dark Secrets of the Lusitania (2012) describes an expedition investigating the wreck made by Greg Bemis and a crew of divers in 2011.[133]
Software and multimedia
A publicity still from the forthcoming virtual museum experience Lustania: The Greyhound's Wake
Lusitania: The Greyhound's Wake is an upcoming first-personvirtual museum being developed by HFX Studios. The project includes a virtual walkthrough tour of the Lusitania as well as a real-time sinking simulation, with an emphasis on historical accuracy, working directly with historians and researchers.[134]
Wreck artefacts
One of the three propellers from the Lusitania that were salvaged from the wreck in 1982 is now on display as a memorial at Merseyside Maritime Museum in Liverpool, England.
The Merseyside Maritime Museum in Liverpool, which was the home port of the Cunard line, has a large exhibit about Lusitania sinking. In 1982 one of the ship's four-bladed propellers was raised from the wreck; it is now on permanent display at the Albert Dock.[135]
A propeller from the wreck is on display at the Hilton Anatole in Dallas, Texas.[136]
Another salvaged propeller from the ship was melted down to create golf clubs in the 1980s.[137][138]
A lifeboat davit and some other artefacts are displayed at the Lusitania Museum & Old Head Signal Tower on Old Head of Kinsale.[139]
A majority of Kim Izzo's Seven Days in May[143] (2017) takes place aboard the Lusitania. The historical fiction alternates between a group of people on board, including Alfred Vanderbilt and Charles Frohman, and in a secret room in Whitehall in London, where coded messages are being intercepted.
The Glass Ocean (2019), written by Karen White, Lauren Willig and Beatriz Williams, rotates narrators and time periods.[144] One of the storylines takes place aboard the Lusitania. It is a fictional account from a passenger's perspective, and weaves in with storylines told in 2013.
David Butler's novel Lusitania (1982) is a fictionalised account of the sinking and events leading up to it.[145]
H.P. Lovecraft's first published book was The Crime of Crimes: Lusitania 1915 (published in Wales), a poem on the sinking of the vessel.[146]
The sinking was the inspiration for Michael Morpurgo's novel Listen to the Moon (2014).[147]
Music
The composer Frank Bridge, a pacifist horrified by the First World War, composed Lament (for Catherine, aged 9 "Lusitania" 1915), for string orchestra, to commemorate the loss of the ship.[148] It premiered by the New Queen's Hall Orchestra, conducted by Bridge, on 15 September, at the 1915 Proms, as part of a programme of "Popular Italian music", the rest of which was conducted by Henry Wood.[149]
Charles Ives's Orchestral Set No. 2 ends with a movement titled, From Hanover Square North, at the End of a Tragic Day, the Voice of the People Again Arose. In the piece, Ives recalls his experience of waiting for a train in New York City as news reports of the sinking come through. The waiting crowd sing "In The Sweet By and By", picking up the tune from a barrel organ. Their voices can be heard at the start of the piece, and the hymn tune itself appears at the end.[150]
A popular song, "As the Lusitania Went Down" (1915) by Arthur J. Lamb and F. Henri Klickmann[151] was published by C. K. Root & Co. of Chicago and New York.[152] It was described by The Music Trade Review on 29 May 1915 as "One of the most interesting of the songs that have made their appearance in the commemoration of the Lusitania disaster."[153]
The song "When the Lusitania Went Down" (1915) by Charles McCarron and Nat Vincent was published by Leo Feist, in New York.[154]Columbia Records issued a recording sung by baritone Herbert Stuart (otherwise known as Albert Wiederhold) and with orchestra accompaniment, as an 80 rpm disc.[155]
The song "Lusitania" from American black metal band Minenwerfer, on their second album Nihilistischen.
"Lusitania" from American singer-songwriter Andrew Bird. The song features vocals by Annie Clark of St. Vincent.
The song "Dead Wake" from post-hardcore band Thrice.
The song "Lusitania" from post-hardcore band June of 44 from the album Tropics and Meridians.
Controversies
Cruiser rules and Admiralty instructions
The "prize rules" or "cruiser rules", based in customary law and influenced by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the 1909 London Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War, governed the seizure of vessels at sea during wartime. Although changes in technology such as radio and the submarine would eventually make parts of them irrelevant, they were generally acknowledged at the start of the war. Merchant ships were to be warned by warships, and their passengers and crew allowed to abandon ship before they were sunk, unless the ship resisted or tried to escape, or was in a convoy protected by warships. Limited armament on a merchant ship, such as one or two guns, did not necessarily affect the ship's immunity to attack without warning, and neither did a cargo of munitions or materiel.[156][157]
Germany's declared "war zone". From 18 February 1915, all Allied ships within would be liable to attack, possibly without warning.
Debates between the German Admiralty and the German government over unrestricted submarine warfare had been ongoing since 1914, with senior naval figures proposing that it would swiftly and easily win the war. In November 1914 the British announced that due to German placement of mines, the entire North Sea was now a "military area", and issued orders restricting the passage of neutral shipping into and through the North Sea to special channels where supervision would be possible (the other approaches having been mined). Taking advantage of this and the British Admiralty's order of 31 January 1915 that British merchant ships should fly neutral colours as a ruse de guerre,[158]Admiral Hugo von Pohl, commander of the German High Seas Fleet and outgoing Chief of the Admiralty, acted outside of the normal protocols and declared an abandonment of cruiser rules, publishing a warning in the Deutscher Reichsanzeiger (Imperial German Gazette) on 4 February 1915:[159]
(1) The waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, are hereby declared to be a War Zone. From February 18 onwards every enemy merchant vessel encountered in this zone will be destroyed, nor will it always be possible to avert the danger thereby threatened to the crew and passengers.
(2) Neutral vessels also will run a risk in the War Zone, because in view of the hazards of sea warfare and the British authorization of January 31 of the misuse of neutral flags, it may not always be possible to prevent attacks on enemy ships from harming neutral ships.[160]
Despite wrangling in the German government to limit the scope of the navy's proposed strategy, privately, directives went further, with Admiral Gustav Bachmann directing submarine captains to attack passenger vessels, so as to obtain a shock effect and deter shipping.[161]
International reaction was negative, with many considering the announcement a bluff. Most considered cruiser rules to be still valid, even beyond the end of the war.[156] Nevertheless, in response, the British Admiralty issued orders on 10 February 1915 which directed merchant ships to escape from hostile U-boats when possible, but "if a submarine comes up suddenly close ahead of you with obvious hostile intention, steer straight for her at your utmost speed... [...] she will probably dive, in which case you will have ensured your safety..."[162] Further instructions ten days later advised armed steamers to open fire on a submarine that is "obviously pursuing with hostile intentions", even if it had not yet fired. Private individuals offered bounties for submarines sunk. Given the vulnerability of a submarine to ramming or even small-calibre shellfire, a U-boat that surfaced and gave warning against a merchantman which had been given such instructions was putting itself in significant danger. The Germans knew of these, even though they were intended to be secret, copies having been obtained from captured ships and from wireless intercepts.[163] Bailey and Ryan in their book The Lusitania Disaster put much emphasis on these orders, pointing out that though the directives were "definitely designed to save shipping", attempting to ram or even merely to evade could be argued to make attacking the ship legitimate. In their opinion, this, rather than the munitions, the nonexistent armament, or any other suggested reason, is the best legal justification for the Germans' actions, though Berlin never made an "emphatic" point of it.[164]
105mm deck gun taken from U-20's sister ship U-19. Usage of such guns accounted for the majority of early sinkings and were considered more acceptable legally.
Gerhard Ritter notes though that even by 1916, the majority of sinkings were still conducted with warning by U-boat deck guns, for they were far more effective than limited and inaccurate torpedoes.[165] Days before, U-20 herself had sunk Earl of Lathom and Candidate while first allowing the crew to escape in boats. The Lusitania was a much larger and faster ship, with a better chance of evading or ramming, though commercial vessels only successfully sunk a submarine through ramming once during the war (in 1918 the White Star LinerHMT Olympic, sister ship to the Titanic and Britannic, rammed SM U-103 in the English Channel).
In his communications with Germany, President Wilson adhered strictly to cruiser rules, claiming that only 'actual resistance' by the ship would in his view make the attack legitimate, and that if a ship cannot be attacked safely and legally, then she should simply not be attacked.[109] In argument with German political leaders during the Arabic crisis, Admiral Bachmann argued that they did not want Britain to adhere to the Declaration of London, as it was more important to be able to continue the submarine attacks and British actions helped justify that.[166]
The second explosion
Contemporary British drawing of Lusitania being torpedoed, showing now-debunked "second torpedo"
Many survivors from the Lusitania report that a second explosion took place either immediately or a few seconds afterwards, some suggesting it felt more severe.[167] This explosion has been used to explain the speed of Lusitania's sinking, and has been the subject of debate since the disaster, with the situation of the wreck (lying on top of the site of the torpedo hit) making obtaining definitive answers difficult. At the time, official inquiries attributed it to a second torpedo attack from the U-boat, as was recalled by multiple witnesses. However, testimony and radio communications from U-20 makes clear that only one torpedo was fired towards the Lusitania, Schwieger even commenting in his war diary that firing a second torpedo was impossible due to the crowd of frenzied passengers who dived into the ocean in panic. It is possible that a second torpedo, or even a second submarine was present and was covered up, though this is unlikely.[168]
A debated theory assigns the blame for the second blast on Lusitania's cargo. This included tons of .303 rifle/machine-gun cartridges, shell casings and fuses, all of which were listed on the ship's two-page manifest, filed with US Customs after she departed. The small arms ammunition were known to be non-explosive in bulk, and were clearly marked as such. It was perfectly legal under American shipping regulations for the liner to carry these; experts agreed they were not to blame for the second explosion. The inquiry at the time of the sinking found that there were no other explosives on board,[169][170] though there has been a long history (starting from German propagandists) of people claiming otherwise. Patrick O'Sullivan agrees that the shells were empty (to be filled with explosives on arrival) and the fuses non-explosive, using sworn testimony from the manufacturer in a later case and an analysis of the shells' listed weight. He asserts that a consignment of fine aluminium powder, possibly disturbed during the first explosion, may be responsible.[171] In experiments though, the explosion of aluminum powder or guncotton (pyroxylene) (a suggested hidden explosive) did not appear to match the properties observed at the time. The presence of other secret explosives has never been proven.[172] Eyewitness reports, including accounts by the U-boat captain and onlookers who saw a specific lifeboat destroyed, also tend to place the position of the initial torpedo strike far back from the cargo hold.[55]
Side plan view of Lusitania. Locations relevant to sinking are highlighted, specifically cargo hold, bridge U-20 reported striking behind, No. 5 boat witnesses reported seeing destroyed, coal bunker, and the boiler rooms. The boiler rooms also have smaller coal bunkers running along the side of the ship.[55]
In the 1960s, American diver John Light dived repeatedly to the site of the shipwreck in efforts to prove the existence of contraband explosives aboard Lusitania's cargo hold, which had been ignited by the torpedo. In 1993, Dr. Robert Ballard, the famous explorer who discovered Titanic and Bismarck, conducted an in-depth exploration of the wreck of Lusitania. Ballard, believing initially that the explosion was due to contraband, tried to confirm John Light's findings of a large hole on the port side of the wreck. Instead he found no hole, and when he inspected the whole exposed area of the cargo hold he found it "clearly undamaged". He thus concluded no cargo explosion took place. During his investigation, Ballard noted a large quantity of coal on the sea bed near the wreck, and after consulting an explosives expert advanced the theory of a coal dust explosion. He believed dust in depleted coal bunkers would have been thrown into the air by the torpedo detonation; the resulting cloud would have been ignited by a spark, causing the second explosion.[173][174] Critics of the theory say coal dust would have been too damp to have been stirred into the air by the torpedo impact in explosive concentrations,[168] or that the coal bunker where the torpedo struck would have been flooded almost immediately by seawater flowing through the damaged hull plates.[167]
In 2007, marine forensic investigators considered that an explosion in the ship's steam-generating plant could be a plausible explanation for the second explosion. Though accounts from the few survivors who managed to escape from the forward two boiler rooms reported that the ship's boilers did not explode, Leading Fireman Albert Martin later testified he thought the torpedo entered the boiler room and exploded between a group of boilers. Though this account was a physical impossibility, many others did place the torpedo strike in the general vicinity of the boiler rooms.[175] It is also known the forward boiler room filled with steam, and steam pressure feeding the turbines dropped dramatically following the second explosion. These point toward a failure, of one sort or another, in the ship's steam-generating plant. It is possible the failure came, not directly from one of the boilers, but rather in the high-pressure steam lines to the turbines.[176] Witnesses reported explosions many minutes after the attack from the flooded parts of the ship, which suggests at least some of the boilers did explode.[167]
Another theory is that in fact only one explosion took place, with the "first explosion" merely the physical impact of the torpedo on the hull, though this faces the problem that torpedoes of the time used were fused to explode immediately on impact.[168] In any case, explanations like this and the steam lines theory propose that torpedo damage alone, striking near the boiler rooms, sunk Lusitania quickly without a second substantial explosion,[55] and are strengthened by recent research that found that this blast would be enough to cause, on its own, serious off-centre flooding. The deficiencies of the ship's original watertight bulkhead design would then exacerbate the situation, as did the many portholes which had been left open for ventilation. In 1997, naval architects at JMS argued this point, noting that once the ship lost steam pressure, systems like automatic watertight doors would no longer function, allowing the ship in their simulations to sink as fast as it did without any additional damage.[177] In 2012, explosives researchers at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory agreed, arguing that their experiments and evidence from the wreck showed that the torpedo itself caused the catastrophic sinking, with the second explosion having little impact.[172] Historian J. Kent Layton reviewed 86 survivor accounts in 2016, and believed that these, together with the immediate 15 degree list of the ship, indicate that the torpedo struck in between boiler rooms 1 and 2. This was an especially vulnerable location, allowing immediate flooding from both boiler rooms' bunkers, and led to a secondary explosion from the boilers or steam apparatus within that likely did not cause much additional critical damage. The speed of the sinking was thus due to the poor ability of Lusitania to contain flooding.[167]
British Government deliberately putting Lusitania at risk
Churchill and Fisher. Churchill is commonly pointed to as the main culprit, with others in the Admiralty perhaps assisting in a cover up.
There has long been a theory, expressed by historian and former British naval intelligence officer Patrick Beesly and authors Colin Simpson and Donald E. Schmidt among others, that Lusitania was deliberately placed in danger by the British authorities, so as to entice a U-boat attack and thereby drag the US into the war on the side of Britain.[178][179] Simpson and later authors point to a letter Winston Churchill wrote to Walter Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade, on 12 February shortly after the German announcement, focusing on a line where he states it's "most important to attract neutral shipping to our shores, in the hope especially of embroiling the United States with Germany."[179][180]
Beesly concludes: "unless and until fresh information comes to light, I am reluctantly driven to the conclusion that there was a conspiracy deliberately to put Lusitania at risk in the hope that even an abortive attack on her would bring the United States into the war. Such a conspiracy could not have been put into effect without Winston Churchill's express permission and approval."[178]
At the post-sinking inquiry, Captain Turner refused to answer certain questions on the grounds of war-time secrecy imperatives. The British government continues to keep secret certain documents relating to the final days of the voyage, including certain of the signals passed between the Admiralty and Lusitania. Some authors also claim that the records that are available are often missing critical pages, and assert a number of other disputed claims:[181][182][183]
The British authorities were aware (thanks to the secret decryption activities of Room 40) that a German submarine was in the path of Lusitania, but decided to not to divert the ship to a safer route.
The authorities deliberately and maliciously refused to provide a destroyer escort.
The ship was ordered to reduce speed in the war zone to make it an easy target.
Such a big ship cannot be expected to sink quickly from a single torpedo strike.[citation needed]
Most historians conclude that such a conspiracy is unlikely. The flow of Room 40 intelligence to merchant shipping, even if it could have been useful, had always been hampered by the overriding goal of protecting the secrecy of the source. Nevertheless, the ship had been repeatedly warned about the general presence of submarines in the area, and informed about U-20's previous sinkings. Indeed, Turner claimed later in life that he felt overwhelmed by the number of warnings he got, imagining that there were perhaps six submarines waiting for him.[46] Escorts were also limited in availability and Lusitania was faster and less vulnerable than those that were available.[184] There would be very little guarantee of a successful attack even with perfect information, as the slow speed of a submerged submarine would require the ship to pass within a few hundred yards of the attacker and torpedo attacks were unreliable at this time anyway. Churchill was speaking to Runciman in the context of offering insurance to neutral merchant shipping that Germany hoped to deter from trading with Britain. His statements did not apply to a British liner – indeed, his "embroilment" was meant to create "safety" for Allied ships like the Lusitania.[185] Any secrecy could also be explained in terms of avoiding embarrassment at ineffectual and disorganised British anti-submarine warfare measures.[186]
There was also little advantage to the US joining the war at this time,[187] nor was American reaction certain – German submarine captains had, after all, been given deliberate orders to target passenger vessels believing this would produce a useful deterrent effect on shipping,[188] and the anti-interventionalist Secretary of State Bryan reacted to the sinking by advising President Wilson to instead simply prohibit passenger ships from carrying ammunition.[189][190] In 1916, after the Germans were pressured into restricting their submarine campaign, relations between the US and Germany actually improved even as tonnage of ships sunk grew. Meanwhile, relations with the British became markedly worse, with some even suggesting that America join the war against the Allies.[184][191]
War munitions
Workers producing .303 British ammunition of the type acknowledged to be on the ship. Britain domestically produced the vast majority of its WWI ammunition though imports to supplement supplies were being considered at this time.
Lusitania was officially carrying among her cargo 4200 cases of rifle/machine-gun ammunition, 1,250 cases of empty shrapnel artillery shells, and the artillery fuzes for those shells stored separately. This comprised a total of 173 tons.[5][192][2] In September 2008, .303 cartridges were recovered from the wreck by diver Eoin McGarry.[193] Additional declared material could be used for military purposes. The cargo included 50 barrels and 94 cases of aluminium (making 46 tons), an unknown quantity of which was in the powdered form used to produce explosives at Woolwich Arsenal,[171] as well as other metals, leather and rubber.[194]
Overall, these supplies represented around a third to a half (depending on what is counted) of the declared financial value of the cargo aboard the ship, but a relatively small volume of cargo on the ship.[2] The passenger ship was also not an efficient cargo carrier, as much smaller dedicated vessels could carry far more cargo. For example, the SS Mont-Blanc, involved in the Halifax explosion, could carry almost 3000 tons of materials despite being a tenth the size. It also may be noted that the British War Office considered the majority of US-manufactured ammunition in this period to be of poor quality and so "suitable for emergency use only", and in any case incapable of supplying consumption of over 5 million rounds per day. American ammunition contracts were cancelled in 1916.[195]
Some authors speculate on the presence of undeclared explosive munitions. Author Steven L. Danver alleges that Lusitania was also secretly carrying a large quantity of nitrocellulose (gun cotton).[196] Another theory suggests 90 tons of butter and lard (un-refrigerated due to a lack of space and allegedly destined to a "Royal Navy Weapons Testing Facility" in Shoeburyness) may have been something else.[197] Additional speculation centered on a consignment of furs, sent from Dupont de Nemours, a company that also manufactured explosives,[198] though such furs were reported to have washed ashore in Ireland.[42] Other authors have suggested that the shells were in fact live, which would mean that around 5 tonnes of cordite was on board, a notion that contradicts the fact that the declared weight of the shells corresponds to ones empty of explosive fill.[171] No evidence of additional secret explosives has so far been found.[2]
Many authors have suggested some sort of cover-up from the British or American authorities regarding the presence of the munitions.[199][200][201] Yet the presence of the materiel was well known at the time, being made public in newspapers,[100] raised in the official British inquiry,[169] and presented to President Wilson.[202] When Senator Robert M. La Follette suggested in 1917 a conspiracy where Wilson was warned that the ship carried 6 million rounds of ammunition, the New York authorities responded by providing him with the correct number.[203] It is true that due to wartime censorship, issues of war materials were not to be freely discussed in the British press,[204] though Germany's communications with the US were printed in British newspapers.[205] However, official denial of the presence of "munitions" or "special ammunition" at the time really related to a denial of the possibility that the ship was carrying cargo dangerous to the passengers[206] (hence statements like "she had on board 4200 cases of cartridges [...] they certainly do not come under the classification of ammunition"), or a denial that the ship was an armed warship ("equipped with masked guns, supplied with trained gunners and special ammunition").[110] The position taken by the British and Americans was not that there was no war materiel, but rather that what was present aboard the ship did not remove the passengers' right to safety, which is inherently endangered when attacked the way the ship was.[207]
Bailey and Ryan discuss this in detail, noting that it was common knowledge that "dozens of ships" left New York with similar or larger cargoes of small arms ammunition and other military supplies. Earlier that year, Turner captained another Cunard liner that transported 15 inch naval artillery, despite public protests from Germany. They conclude that sending secret, illegal explosives in a passenger ship is unlikely given the availability of other dedicated cargo ships. They and other authors also note the contradiction of some authors suggesting that the ship was carrying essential war cargo, and yet simultaneously arguing the British were conspiring to get her sunk.[208][209] The presence or absence of munitions being carried by Lusitania, while raised by early German propaganda, would not have affected the Germans' intention to target her, or the arguments both in favour and against the legitimacy of her sinking. It was in fact initially concocted as a measure by German Admiral von Tirpitz to "incite public opinion at home".[87]
Other controversies
The wreck was depth-charged or attacked with Hedgehog mortars.[210] A Dublin-based technical diver, Des Quigley, who dived on the wreck in the 1990s, reported that the wreck is "like Swiss cheese" and the seabed around her "is littered with unexploded hedgehog mines".[211] Similar observations were made by other explorers, such as the 1993 Ballard expedition.[212] Conspiracy theorists have suggested this was part of a plot to destroy evidence of British deception, such as the presence of undeclared explosives. Instead, historians suggest this was due to NATO anti-submarine warfare exercises in 1948,[212] which used the wreck as a target at a time when its historical value was not considered important. Layton notes that the wreck was sold for a mere £1000, and that despite the bombardment, the state of the wreck was such that expeditions in 1993 and 2011 could verify the intact state of the cargo hold, including "neatly stacked" ammunition.[213]
Another debated topic is the degree of blame that can be placed on Captain Turner. This was the centre of the wartime inquiries, which raised the issue of whether he had disobeyed Admiralty instructions. While he was exonerated at the time, modern historians disagree as to whether this was appropriate. In addition Turner is blamed for the poor preparedness of the ship, including the poor quality of lifeboat drilling, and allowing many portholes to be open. While most would agree that running into the submarine was ultimately a matter of bad luck, with the more modern understanding that the ship may have sunk from torpedo damage alone, the degree to which Turner may have exacerbated the loss of life gains greater significance.[176][41]
It is also suggested that there may have been some cover-up on the German end. This centers around the typewritten nature of Schwieger's logs, which implies a lost, handwritten version. One suggestion is that Schwieger's log was edited to "humanise" his account, the commander being otherwise not noted for expressing much sympathy for his victims.[214] A few survivor accounts also noted that they saw the submarine surfacing as the ship was sinking, some offering the criticism that the sub did not offer aid. While this is an unrealistic demand, it has been suggested that this surfacing did genuinely happen.[215]
The wreck of Lusitania lies on her starboard side at an approximately 30-degree angle in 305 feet (93 metres) of sea water. She is severely collapsed onto her starboard side as a result of the force with which she slammed into the sea floor, and over decades, Lusitania has deteriorated significantly faster than Titanic because of the corrosion in the winter tides. The keel has an "unusual curvature", in a boomerang shape, which may be related to a lack of strength from the loss of her superstructure.[216] The beam is reduced with the funnels missing, presumably due to deterioration.[216] The bow is the most prominent portion of the wreck with the stern damaged from the removal of three of the four propellers by Oceaneering International in 1982 for display.
Some of the prominent features on Lusitania include her still-legible name, some bollards with the ropes still intact, pieces of the ruined promenade deck, some portholes, the prow and the remaining propeller. Recent expeditions to the wreck have revealed that Lusitania is in surprisingly poor condition compared to Titanic, as her hull has already started to collapse.[216]
^ a b c dThe official figures give 1195 lost out of 1959, excluding three stowaways who also were lost. The figures here eliminate some repetitions from the list and people subsequently known not to be on board. "Passenger and Crew Statistics". The Lusitania Resource. 12 December 2010. Retrieved 27 April 2024.
^ a b c d e"The Lusitania Resource: Lusitania Passengers & Crew, Facts & History". rmslusitania.info. Retrieved 14 February 2018.
^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t uPreston, D (2003). Wilful Murder. The Sinking of the Lusitania. London : Black Swan. ISBN 978-0-552-99886-4.
^ a b cThe exact number varies across sources. 128 is the official number. Hoehling gives 124, Lusitania's passenger manifest suggests many more, and the Library of Congress gives 123. "The Lusitania Disaster | Articles & Essays | Newspaper Pictorials: World War I Rotogravures, 1914–1919 | Digital Collections | Library of Congress". Library of Congress. Retrieved 28 December 2021.
^ a bDouglas Carl Peifer (1 June 2016). Choosing War: Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay Incidents. Oxford University Press. p. 269.
^King & Wilson 2015, p. 5.
^Manson, Janet Marilyn (1977). International law, German submarines and American policy (Master of Arts thesis). Portland State University. doi:10.15760/etd.2489.
^"Remembering the Sinking of the RMS Lusitania". history.com. Retrieved 15 February 2018.
^ a bWatson, Bruce (2006). Atlantic convoys and Nazi raiders. Greenwood. p. 9. ISBN 978-0-275-98827-2.
^Simpson p. 60
^Layton, J. Kent. Lusitania: An Illustrated Biography (2010, Amberley Books)
^Tucker, Spencer; Priscilla Mary Roberts (2005). World War I. ABC-CLIO. pp. 836–837. ISBN 978-1-85109-420-2.
^Germany's second submarine campaign against the Allies during the First World War was unrestricted in scope, as was submarine warfare during the Second World War.
^Tirpitz, Alfred von (1926). Politische Dokumente vol 2. p. 308.
^Manson 1977, pp. 74–82, 91–101.
^ a b"The Lusitania Resource: War". 26 March 2011.
^Referred to in Lusitania, by Diana Preston, and Lusitania: An Illustrated Biography by J. Kent Layton (2010, Amberley Books).
^Beesly 1982, p. 95.
^ a bPreston, D. (2002) Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker & Company.
^Bailey, Thomas A.; Ryan, Paul B. (1975). The Lusitania Disaster: An Episode in Modern Warfare and Diplomacy. New York/London: Free Press/Collier Macmillan.
^New photographic evidence presented in Lusitania: An Illustrated Biography, by J. Kent Layton (2010, Amberley Books)
^Link 1960, p. 355–357.
^Link 1960, p. 366–367.
^Testimony of A.A. Booth at the Mersey Inquiry.
^"Commander Daniel Dow RD, RNR". Dow Family History. Archived from the original on 16 May 2011. Retrieved 19 January 2014.
^ a b cBernstorff, Johann Heinrich von (1920). My Three Years in America. pp. 136–140.
^Imperial German Embassy. "Notice to travellers". fas.org.
^Bailey & Ryan 1975, pp. 70–71.
^"Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume I". Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute.
^The Lusitania Saga & Myth: 100 Years On ISBN 978-1-473-82176-7 p. 53
^"Detective-Inspector William John Pierpoint". 27 June 2011. Retrieved 15 February 2018.
^Layton, J. Kent: Lusitania: an illustrated biography of the Ship of Splendor, p. 177.
^Beesly, p. 101
^Beesly pp. 99–100
^Molony, Senan (2004). Lusitania, an Irish Tragedy. Cork: Mercier Press. p. 8. ISBN 978-1-85635-452-3.
^Beesly p. 103
^ a b cSome Original Documents from the British Admiralty, Room 40, regarding the sinking of Lusitania: PhotoCopies from The National Archives in Kew, Richmond, UK
^Beesly pp. 103–104
^Bailey & Ryan 1975, pp. 135–142.
^ a b c d"The Culpability of Captain Turner". The Lusitania Resource. 26 March 2011.
^ a bBailey & Ryan 1975.
^Beesly pp. 104–105
^"Lusitania and Mauretania: Cunard's Revolutionary Liners". YouTube. The Great Big Move. Retrieved 24 September 2023.
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^ a bBailey & Ryan 1975, pp. 225.
^Ramsay p. 79
^Beesly p. 108
^Beesly pp. 84–85 (U-20 log entry transcript. Log first published in L'illustration in 1920)
^ a b"English Translation of His Majesty's Submarine U-20 War Diary".
^Bailey & Ryan 1975, pp. 150–161.
^Bailey & Ryan 1975, pp. 148.
^Beesly
^Schmidt, Donald E. (29 June 2005). The Folly of War: American Foreign Policy, 1898–2004. Algora Publishing. p. 70. ISBN 978-0-87586-383-2.
^ a b c dJ. Kent Layton. "RMS Lusitania Home".
^"Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry – The torpedoing of the ship – The launching of the life-boats". titanicinquiry.org. Archived from the original on 8 July 2006. Retrieved 18 February 2018.
^Linnihan, Ellen (2005). Stranded at Sea. Saddleback Educational Publications. p. 32. ISBN 978-1-56254-830-8.
^Schapiro, Amy; Thomas H. Kean (2003). Millicent Fenwick. Rutgers University Press. pp. 21–22. ISBN 978-0-8135-3231-8.
^Des Hickey and Gus Smith, Seven Days to Disaster: The Sinking of the Lusitania, 1981, William Collins, ISBN 0-00-216882-0
^Bernd Langensiepen: Die Legende von Karl Vögeles "Meuterei" auf U 20. In: Marine-Nachrichtenblatt. Das Veröffentlichungsblatt des Arbeitskreises Krieg zur See 1914–18. 3/2012 № 8 pp. 55–60.
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^Ramsay pp. 147–149
^Bailey & Ryan 1975, p. 217.
^Peeke, Mitch; Steven Jones, Kevin Walsh-Johnson (2002). The Lusitania Story. Leo Cooper. ISBN 978-0-85052-902-9.
^ a bMersey. "Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry Report".
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^Bailey & Ryan 1975, p. 217-221.
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^"Sinking Justified, Says Dr. Dernburg; Lusitania a "War Vessel", Known to be Carrying Contraband, Hence Search Was Not Necessary" (PDF). The New York Times. 9 May 1915. p. 4. Justification of the sinking of the liner Lusitania by German submarines as a man of war was advanced today by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, former German Colonial Secretary and regarded as the Kaiser's official mouthpiece in the United States. Dr. Dernburg gave out a statement at the Hollenden Hotel following his arrival in Cleveland to address the City Club at noon on Germany's attitude in the present war
^The Germans fabricated a non-existent Parliamentary declaration that "practically all British merchant vessels [are] armed and provided with hand grenades" Bailey & Ryan, 1975. p. 244
^Halsey, Francis Whiting (1919). The Literary Digest History of the World War. Funk & Wagnalls. p. 255.
^Schreiner, George Abel (1918). The Iron Ration: Three Years in Warring Central Europe. Harper & Brothers. p. 314.
^Ernest K. May. The World War and American isolationism. pp. 205–6.
^Gilbert, Martin First World War (1994) pp. 157–158 [ISBN missing]
^ a b cLink, Arthur S. (1960). Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality 1914–1915. pp. 398–399.
^"The Ambassador in Germany (Gerard) to the Secretary of State". 13 July 1915.
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^ a bBurns, G. (2003). "Excerpt from The Lusitania Medal and its Varieties". LusitaniaMedal.com. Archived from the original on 3 March 2012.
^One from Emile Henry Lacombe appeared in the New York Times in 1917. "A NEW THEORY OF THE LUSITANIA SINKING.; The Evidence of the German Medal Dated May 5 and the Report of the Explosive "Cigars" on Board" (PDF). Retrieved 15 February 2018.
^"Lusitania Sunk by a Submarine, Probably 1,260 Dead". The New York Times. 8 May 1915. p. 1. Archived from the original on 9 June 2019. Retrieved 9 June 2019.
^ a bJones, Howard (2001). Crucible of Power: A History of U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1897. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 73. ISBN 978-0-8420-2918-6.
^Bernstorff 1920, pp. 140–147.
^Bernstorff 1920, pp. 143–144.
^"SS Orduna in dazzle camouflage, diorama model". National Museums Liverpool.
^"Lusitania was unarmed" (PDF). New York Times. 10 May 1915.
^Doswald-Beck, Louise; International Institute of Humanitarian Law (1995). San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea. Cambridge University Press. p. 124. ISBN 978-0-521-55864-8.
^ a b"Lusitania was Unarmed" (PDF). New York Times. 10 May 1915.
^"Lusitania Controversy – Armament and Cargo". gwpda.org.
^Jeanette Keith (2004). Rich Man's War, Poor Man's Fight: Race, Class, and Power in the Rural South during the First World War. U. of North Carolina Press. pp. 1–5. ISBN 978-0-8078-7589-6.
^Gilbert, Martin First World War (1994) p. 157 [ISBN missing]
^"The Secretary of State to President Wilson". 10 May 1915.
^Zieger, Robert H. (1972). America's Great War. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 24–25. ISBN 978-0-8476-9645-1.
^Manson 1977, pp. 110–125.
^"This government has already taken occasion to inform the Imperial German government that it cannot admit the adoption of such measures or such a warning of danger to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality; and that it must hold the Imperial German government to a strict accountability for any infringement of those rights, intentional or incidental." "U.S. Protest over the Sinking of the Lusitania". 28 November 2010.
^Manson 1977, pp. 114–115.
^ a bManson 1977, pp. 124–125.
^ a b"Second U.S. Protest over the Sinking of the Lusitania". 28 November 2010.
^Manson 1977, p. 130.
^"It is manifestly possible, therefore, to lift the whole practice of submarine attack above the criticism which it has aroused and remove the chief causes of offence. [...] Repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly." "Third U.S. Protest over the Sinking of the Lusitania". 28 November 2010.
^Manson 1977, pp. 121.
^Ritter 1972, pp. 132–133.
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^ a bGardiner, Robert; Randal Gray, Przemyslaw Budzbon (1985). Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1906–1921. Conway. p. 137. ISBN 978-0-85177-245-5.
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^ a bF. Cyril James (1927). "Modern Developments of the Law of Prize". University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register. 75 (6): 505–526. doi:10.2307/3307534. JSTOR 3307534.
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^ a b c dLayton, J Kent (2016). "The Second Explosion". Conspiracies at Sea: Titanic and Lusitania.
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^ a bSchmidt 2005, p. 71.
^"It is most important to attract neutral shipping to our shores, in the hope especially of embroiling the U.S. with Germany. The German formal announcement of indiscriminate submarining has been made to the United States to produce a deterrent effect on traffic. For our part we want the traffic—the more the better & if some of it gets into trouble better still. Therefore do please furbish up at once your insurance offer to neutrals trading with us after February 18th. The more that come, the greater our safety & the German embarrassment." Cameron Hazlehurst (1971). Politicians at War: July 1914 to May 1915. pp. 188–89.
^Beesly 1982, Chapter 7.
^Steiger, Brad; Steiger, Sherry Hansen (2006). Conspiracies and Secret Societies: The Complete Dossier. OMNIGRAPHICS. ISBN 978-0-7808-0921-5. Archived from the original on 3 July 2023. Retrieved 3 July 2023.
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^ a bKeith Allen. "Lusitania Controversy: Warning and conspiracy".
^Richard M. Langworth (2017). Winston Churchill, Myth and Reality: What he actually did and said. McFarland. p. 69. ISBN 978-1-4766-6583-2.
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^Indeed, US officials discussed the "disturbing possibilities" of Germany provoking war for its own advantage. "The Secretary of State to President Wilson". 3 April 1915.
^Tirpitz, p. 308
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^Ministry of Munitions (1922). "Part VI: Small arms ammunition". History of the Ministry of Munitions: The Supply of Munitions. Vol. 11. p. 38.
^Danver, Steven L (2010). Popular Controversies in World History: Investigating History's Intriguing Questions. ABC-CLIO. p. 114. ISBN 978-1-59884-078-0. Archived from the original on 3 July 2023. Retrieved 3 July 2023.
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^"Did Britain doom the Lusitania?". BBC History Magazine. Archived from the original on 24 February 2017. Retrieved 23 February 2017 – via History Extra. Government papers released in 2014, and recent dives on the wreck, have confirmed that the Germans were right all along: the ship was indeed carrying war material.
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^Simpson 1972, p. 11.
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^"The German Excuse; Blame officially put on Great Britain; Cargo of Contraband". The Times. 10 May 1915.
^In particular, in reference to the German contention that otherwise, the ship could have been sunk without endangering the passengers. Bailey & Ryan 1975, p. 253
^Manson 1977, p. 142.
^Bailey & Ryan 1975, pp. 102–113.
^O'Sullivan 2000, pp. 94–95.
^King & Wilson 2015, p. 299.
^Sides & Goodwin Sides 2009.
^ a bBallard 2007.
^Layton, J Kent (2016). "Destroying the Evidence". Conspiracies at Sea: Titanic and Lusitania.
^Bailey & Ryan 1975, pp. 158–161.
^Layton, J Kent (2016). "Surfacing". Conspiracies at Sea: Titanic and Lusitania.
^ a b cBishop, Leigh (2003). "Return to Lusitania". Advanced Diver Magazine (13). Retrieved 1 May 2011.
Further reading
Burns, Greg, Commemoration of Death: the medals of the Lusitania murders. (2012), full color bleed, 194 pages, ISBN 978-1-4791-1573-0 Available on Createspace e-store
Bailey, Thomas A. "The Sinking of the Lusitania", The American Historical Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (October 1935), pp. 54–73 in JSTOR
Bailey, Thomas A. "German Documents Relating to the 'Lusitania'", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Sep. 1936), pp. 320–337 in JSTOR
Bailey, Thomas A. and Paul B. Ryan. The Lusitania Disaster: An Episode in Modern Warfare and Diplomacy (1975) [ISBN missing]
Ballard, Robert D., & Dunmore, Spencer. (1995). Exploring the Lusitania. New York: Warner Books. [ISBN missing]
Beesly, Patrick (1982). Room 40: British Naval Intelligence, 1914–1918. Long Acre, London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd. ISBN 0-241-10864-0.
Ellis, Edward R.Echoes of Distant Thunder: Life in the United States 1914–1918 (Kodansha Globe, 1996). Chapter 14 covers the sinking of Lusitania, survivors' personal memories and political response. [ISBN missing]
Handlin, Oscar. "A Liner, a U-Boat … and History. American Heritage (June 1954) 6#3 online. Episode in long-term perspective.
Hoehling, A.A.; Hoehling, Mary (1956). The Last Voyage of the Lusitania. Maryland: Madison Books. [ISBN missing]
King, Greg; Wilson, Penny (2015). Lusitania: Triumph, Tragedy and the End of the Edwardian Age}. Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-250-05254-4.
Larson, Erik (2015). Dead Wake: The Last Crossing of the Lusitania. New York: Crown Publishing. ISBN 978-0-307-40886-0.
Lauriat, Charles E. Jr. (1915). "The Lusitania's Last Voyage"
Layton, J. Kent (2010). Lusitania: an illustrated biography. Amberley Books. ISBN 978-1-84868-834-6.
J Kent Layton (2010). The Edwardian Superliners: a trio of trios. Amberley Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84868-835-3.
Ljungström, Henrik. Lusitania. The Great Ocean Liners.
Molony, Senan (2004). Lusitania, an Irish Tragedy. Mercier. p. 192. ISBN 978-1-85635-452-3.
Martin, Michael. (2014). RMS Lusitania, It Wasn't & It Didn't. Dublin: The History Press Ireland. ISBN 978 1 84588 854 1
O'Sullivan, Patrick (2000). The Lusitania: Unravelling the Mysteries. New York: Sheridan House. [ISBN missing]
Mitch Peeke; Steven Jones, Kevin Walsh-Johnson (2002). The Lusitania story. Barnsley, Yorkshire: Leo Coope (Pen and Sword books). ISBN 978-0-85052-902-9.
Peifer, Douglas Carl. (2016). Choosing war: presidential decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay incidents. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0190939601
Peifer, Douglas. (2015) "The Sinking of the Lusitania, Wilson's Response, and Paths Not Taken: Historical Revisionism, the Nye Committee, and the Ghost of William Jennings Bryan." Journal of Military History 79, no. 4 (2015): 1025–45.
Preston, Diana. (2002). Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. Waterville: Thorndike Press. Preston p. 384 [ISBN missing]
Preston, Diana (2002). Wilful Murder: The sinking of the Lusitania. London: Corgi (Transworld publishers). ISBN 0-552-99886-9.
Ramsay, David (2001). Lusitania Saga and Myth. London: Chatham Publishing. ISBN 978-1-86176-170-5.
Ritter, Gerhard (1972). The Sword and the Scepter vol III: The tragedy of statesmanship. University of Miami Press.
Sauder, Eric; Ken Marschall, Audrey Pearl Lawson Johnston (2009). RMS Lusitania: The Ship and Her Record. London: The History Press. ISBN 978-0-7524-5203-6.
Sauder, Eric; Ken Marschall (1991). RMS Lusitania: Triumph of the Edwardian Age. Redondo Beach, CA: Trans-Atlantic Designs. ISBN 978-0-9633946-0-6.
Simpson, Colin. Life Magazine, 13 October 1972, p. 58. Excerpts from Colin Simpson's The Lusitania (1973) The Lusitania Sinking.
Simpson, Colin (1972). Lusitania. Book club associates.
The Sunday Times, (2008) "Is The Riddle of The Lusitania About to be Solved?"
Linda and Gary Cargill "Those Who Dream By Day" [ISBN missing]
Timeline, The Lusitania Resource.
Facts and Figures, The Lusitania Resource.
Droste, C.L. (1972). The Lusitania Case. Riverside, Conn: 7 C's Press. ISBN 978-0-85059-097-5
Protasio, John. (2011). The Day the World was Shocked; The Lusitania Disaster and Its Influence on the Course of World War I, Casemate Publications (US) ISBN 978-1-935149-45-3
External links
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Sinking of RMS Lusitania.
Medlock, Chelsea Autumn: Lusitania, Sinking of, in: 1914–1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
"British Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry". TitanicInquiry.org. Archived from the original on 30 April 2007.
"Historic film footage related to Lusitania". European Film Gateway.
"Lest We Forget: The Lusitania – An in depth account of the sinking". Encyclopedia Titanica. 7 May 2013.
.jpg/1280px-Last_photo_of_Lusitania_May_1_1915_(cropped).jpg)
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.jpg/1280px-Goetz_medal_commemorating_the_German_sinking_of_the_Lusitania_(30689585541).jpg)
![British replica of the Goetz Lusitania medal. Unlike the original Goetz medals which were sand-cast from bronze, the British copies were of diecast iron and were of poorer quality. The English version was altered to read 'May' rather than 'Mai', and originals usually have "KGoetz" on the edge.[91]](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/36/Lusitania_commemorative_German_medal_replica.jpg/1280px-Lusitania_commemorative_German_medal_replica.jpg)
